


REPUBLICANS REBUKED ■ IRAQ BY THE NUMBERS ■ THE TORY BLAIR

DECEMBER 4, 2006

The American Conservative

Chinese Takeout

Why North Korea's
Nukes Should be
Beijing's Problem



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ENTERTAINMENT RIGHT

Daniel McCarthy's assessment of modern campus conservatives (Nov. 6) is spot on. I served as chair of the College Republicans at Stetson University for my freshman and sophomore years and will testify that young conservatives look to the entertainment conservatives for ideological guidance, but there is a perfectly logical explanation.

If I spend hours researching the works of Hayek and apply his ideas to my essays, they will be labeled as conservative and dismissed—that's Dismissed with a capital D+. In my two years at Stetson, I have earned 15 A's, and I learned quickly that liberal appeasement is the way to go. Reading these works for class is out of the question.

That leaves them for leisure time. For most students, Smith and Weaver are not light reading (or in some cases completely inaccessible), and reading them takes valuable time away from homework or parties. It is much more economical to read the works of Hannity and Coulter to dissect the logic of the Left in plain-spoken vernacular.

ERIK DETLEFSEN
Deland, Fla.

NEW DEMOCRAT

Thank you for "GOP Must Go." Can't agree more. I've been a registered Republican all my voting life. This election I will vote for Democrats. I will hold my nose while I do it, but for all the reasons you have articulated and because I believe W. to be a fraud (kindest words I can use), that's what I will do.

DAVID STEWART
Via e-mail

BRAND LOYALTY

I am not a conservative, never have been, probably never will be. But thank you for the Nov. 20 editorial.

What amazes me is the apparent willingness of Republicans not to demand accountability from this administration. Loyalty to the Republican brand, in their eyes, is far more important than loyalty to America herself. It's certainly

one of the greatest tragedies of the Bush presidency that questioning disastrous decisions is seen as equal to treason. Questioning authority is at the heart of what made this country great. It remains to be seen whether that greatness will come again or whether we are a sunset power.

DAVID PEDEN
Florence, Ore.

TAC IS FOR WIMPS

With regard to your cover (Nov. 20), if anybody killed conservatism, it is *TAC*!!! As a person with strong core conservative values, your article contradicts everything I believe in. To vote for liberals to spite conservatives is absolute suicide—something I don't believe in either. As for the war on terror, apparently you don't understand there are millions of Muslims that want us dead. And we did not cause that. To have a strong image in the world, you must be strong. If our image has suffered, it is because we have wimped out in the past.

TED BARRETT
Ellijay, Ga.

WHAT ABOUT THE SCHOOLS?

I read your editorial entitled "GOP Must Go," and I was very disappointed. I find it hard to believe that advancing conservatism involves allowing Democrats to regain power so that they can try to cram their liberal philosophies down our throats.

Also, I feel that your view of the war in Iraq is formed mostly by the liberal media. Your views are simply a reiteration of Democratic talking points. The liberal media report all of the negative in Iraq and extremely little of the good. In Iraq, thousands of schools have been built, over 30,000 new businesses have begun, and the Iraqis have voted in large numbers in several elections.

As far as the argument that Bush's policies have emboldened terrorists, this is a ridiculous. If Bush's policies embolden terrorists, then the terrorists should want these policies to continue

so that they can recruit more terrorists; however, terrorists want the Democrats to regain power. If we pull out of Iraq that would definitely embolden terrorists because then they would see that Americans are spineless pushovers.

I hope that I have provided some useful insights for you.

ROBERT MAUTZ
Zanesville, Ohio

IT'S MY PARTY

Reading your Nov. 20 edition angered me as a conservative. I find it inexcusable that the magazine would even suggest sending a protest vote by voting for Democrats when there is a party that I thought was in line with *The American Conservative* philosophy, that being the U.S. Constitution Party.

The fact that my party isn't even considered as a viable alternative makes me realize that the lesser-of-two-evils mentality in voting has permeated even this magazine. I am sick of this mindset and will now consider canceling my subscription.

JASON REEVES
Redwood City, Calif.

MISSION ACCOMPLISHED

Thank you for your mission statement. I had, in fact, decided that all conservatives were neoconservatives, whom I find to be offensively Machiavellian and nationally self-destructive. While I prefer the tradition of Franklin Delano Roosevelt in social and economic matters, nevertheless your statements are so reasonable and express such clear concern for the common good that I find you a thoughtful compatriot instead of a hostile opponent. I hope your magazine prospers.

ROBERT DESMARAI SULLIVAN
New Orleans, La.

The American Conservative welcomes letters to the editor. Submit by e-mail to letters@amconmag.com, by fax to 703-875-3350, or by mail to 1300 Wilson Blvd., Suite 120, Arlington, VA 22209. Please include your name, address, and phone number. We reserve the right to edit all correspondence for space and clarity.



AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE

[ELECTION]

Minority Report

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[WAR]

INDEFENSIBLE SECRETARY

Fiasco, the title of Thomas Ricks's book about the Iraq War, is the perfect summation of Donald Rumsfeld's tenure as secretary of defense. The mismanagement of the war and Rumsfeld's resistance to changing course have now become Beltway conventional wisdom. Everyone from Hillary Clinton to *The Weekly Standard* to rows of retired generals was able to unite around the idea that Rumsfeld should be replaced.

But his culpability goes far beyond invading without enough troops or an adequate plan to secure order in Baghdad. Iraqis would have no more appreciated being invaded by half a million troops than by the smaller army we sent. The greater mistake—too tame a word—lay in the ways Rumsfeld's Pentagon pushed the president and the country into believing that invading Iraq was a plausible response to 9/11. It was Rumsfeld who staffed the Pentagon with officials who had been pinning for an invasion of Iraq for years before 9/11. His staff poured into the Washington mix a steady stream of essentially false intelligence—cherry-picked factoids that made it seem that Saddam was in cahoots with al-Qaeda and possessed weapons of mass destruction. The transformation of the Pentagon into a vessel for achieving esoteric neoconservative goals was entirely Rumsfeld's doing, and if the new Congress holds hearings about the run-up to the Iraq War, his Office of Special Plans should be the probe's ground zero.

Voters have finally forced George W. Bush to recognize what he long resisted—that Rumsfeld must go. His successor, Robert Gates, is a consummate public servant, willing to leave a job he loved at Texas A&M to take on a hellish task: disengaging from a disastrous war in a way that does the least possible damage to America's national interests.



DARYL CAGLE MSNBC.COM

By temperament and experience, the former CIA chief seems well suited for what will surely be a thankless role. We admire his sense of duty and wish him the best.

[IMMIGRATION]

DEMS FOR BUSH?

Last issue *TAC* assessed the risks of voting Democratic in the midterms. We concluded that it was vital to America's domestic health and global reputation to repudiate the Bush agenda. Moreover, placing even one house of Congress in contrarian hands would check this executive's wilder ambitions: a little gridlock is a good thing.

We were mindful that immigration reform could be imperiled by losing the Republican majority in the House. Tom Tancredo and his brave caucus succeeded in stalling the Senate amnesty bill despite significant White House pressure. But there seemed scant chance that given polls showing overwhelming support for border control and opposition to blanket amnesty, Democrats—many of whom sampled immigration-reform rhetoric on the stump—would use their new majority to deliver gifts from the Bush wish list.

Not that he isn't asking. Before the final results were tallied, Tony Snow was

already talking about the "interesting opportunities" the power shift presented for "comprehensive immigration reform." The next day, the president called immigration "an issue where I believe we can find some common ground with the Democrats."

We hope not. As a matter of pure politics, Democrats would be foolish to enact the agenda items Bush's own party denied him. Worse, they would be handing him a two-for-one victory: his pet legislation along with affirmation that he's indeed "a uniter, not a divider" (his appellation of choice before anointing himself *The Decider*.) Worst of all, they would be bucking the popular will to do so. None of that is a good way to stretch their majority beyond the next two years.

[CULTURE]

ONE WAR AT A TIME

The Nov. 7 elections returned a mixed verdict for social conservatives. They can take heart that voters resoundingly rejected gay marriage: bans in seven states passed, with only Arizona—where the constitutional amendment was so broadly worded that it might have interfered with rights of contract beyond marriage—falling short. But otherwise there was little good news: a Mis-

souri initiative to fund embryonic stem-cell research succeeded, while South Dakota's comprehensive ban on abortion went down to defeat.

Ground lost in the abortion wars is dismaying, but pro-lifers should not be surprised—nor demoralized. The South Dakota result reaffirms what is already well known: the public balks at abortion bans that make no exceptions. Embryonic stem-cell research, meanwhile, has been framed as life-saving medicine for Michael J. Fox rather than as deadly experimentation on human embryos—experimentation that so far has not produced anything like the results its partisans have touted.

In both these battles, conservatives won't be able to advance until they can better educate the public. But that's been difficult over the past five years, as the Right has instead devoted itself to defending an indefensible war in Iraq and throwing up smokescreens for presidential power-grabs. It's high time conservatives made a choice: they can be the War Party or they can be the Party of Life.

[AMERICA]

NATIONAL QUESTION

The deteriorating war in Iraq and Republican congressmen lusting after dollars and pages were uppermost on voters' minds. But two ballot initiatives pointed to another, less pronounced but no less important, theme of the night: voters have had enough of multiculturalism and ethnic stratification. In Michigan, a ban on affirmative action in public education, employment, and contracting won with 58 percent of the vote. In Arizona, an overwhelming 74 percent—including 50 percent of Hispanics—supported a measure to make English the state's official language. These were blow-out victories for conservatives in states that otherwise gave Democrats a very good night. But are Bush, Rove, and RNC chief Ken Mehlman paying atten-

tion? Don't bet on it. If Republicans want to retake Congress in 2008, these issues may provide a way to win. But first the GOP will have to find new leaders—and some backbone.

[JUSTICE]

SADDAM'S EXIT STRATEGY

Unable to produce genuine good news from Iraq before the Tuesday vote, the Bush administration had to settle for the Saddam verdict: *Quelle surprise!* he is guilty of terrible crimes and faces the death penalty. At this point, everyone must solemnly intone that Saddam was an evil figure, and thank someone—George W. Bush and the GOP, perhaps?—that justice will be done.

In some future era, it will be permissible to raise national-interest questions about the whole Saddam obsession. James Pinkerton jumped the gun in these pages over two years ago, using humor to make points that probably couldn't be raised seriously without igniting a chicken-hawk word-processor wargasm. But under the rubric of a Swiftian "Modest Proposal," Pinkerton pointed out that restoring Saddam to power could solve the bevy of problems that the Bush doctrine had created in Iraq: "His bluster aside, Saddam was no threat to the U.S., as now we know. His rattletrap fascist-socialist dictatorship kept Iraq poor and pathetic, completely incapable of maintaining any sort of WMD stockpile."

The post-Saddam Iraq now being born will likely be ethnically divided and largely lawless, with enclaves under the control of radical Shi'ite fundamentalists and Sunni terrorists—men who, unlike Saddam, will never aspire to pal around with Donald Rumsfeld. Saddam was bad man, who killed and tortured many. But Iraq without him is hardly improved, and America, having deluded itself into being obsessed with him, is less safe than it was in March 2003. ■

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Go Webb Go

Is it too soon for a “Webb for President” bandwagon? Of course it is. But Webb’s landslide win in a Southern state—well, make that a pre-recount third of a percent-

age-point win carved from big margins in the Washington suburbs—has transformed him instantly into a commodity of interest for the Democrats, as was former Virginia Gov. Mark Warner before him. A national audience will now become aware of the Webb paradox: the qualities that make him most compelling are the very ones that make him not a particularly smooth or natural politician. Despite Webb’s impressive military background, it’s not as if he commanded armies in a winning war. No one will offer Jim Webb an Eisenhower ride to a higher nomination.

My own Webb bandwagon moment occurred in late September at a fundraiser in Northern Virginia. The candidate arrived, slightly late, while a suburbanite audience awaited the chance to shake his hand, size him up. He worked the room for a few minutes, our host introduced him to me, and he stopped for several minutes to converse about a Paul Schroeder essay that had appeared in *TAC*. This was thrilling, of course, and it’s impossible to imagine any other major-party candidate (even among the coterie of *TAC* readers in the House GOP) who would have behaved the same way.

As an aide shuffled impatiently, Webb shifted into a more normal politician mode, greeting the people gathered. Then he stepped up to address the room. It was an odd speech, devoid of enthusiasm-generating applause lines, indeed devoid of any applause lines at all. It was almost professorial—an

attempt to analyze the categories of Left and Right in the country, explain why they were outmoded and how his campaign was working towards transcending them and fueling a new synthesis. You had to pay attention or you would miss major points.

I found myself recalling a phrase I had first heard in history class about the French socialist Leon Blum—“an intellectual in politics.” Webb was attempting to give voice to common-man themes of the sort that might be inspired by the Scots-Irish of his critically acclaimed ethnography, *Born Fighting*, and to appeal more generally to the American middle and working classes. But if it was a latently populist message, it was delivered in distinctly non-populist style.

Webb’s intellectualism ensures that he will do something that professional politicians hardly ever do: think through a position and take a public stand on it without consulting the polls. The essay he wrote for the *Washington Post* on Iraq, seven months before the war began, was startling in its prescience. Webb questioned whether an overthrow of Saddam would “actually increase our ability to win the war against international terrorism” and pointed out that the measure of military success can be preventing wars and well as fighting them. He charged, “those who are pushing for a unilateral war in Iraq know full well that there is no exit strategy if we invade.” He concluded, “the Iraqis are a multiethnic people filled with competing

factions who in many cases would view a U.S. occupation as infidels invading the cradle of Islam. ... In Japan, American occupation forces quickly became 50,000 friends. In Iraq, they would quickly become 50,000 terrorist targets.” If any major senators were thinking like this long before the invasion, not many Americans heard of it.

Peter Boyer’s *New Yorker* profile of the Webb-Allen contest noted that Webb spent much campaign time lamenting the widening gap between the very rich and the rest of the country, noting that he regularly pushes for stronger border security and strict enforcement of laws that will stop corporate exploitation of cheap illegal-alien labor. Webb adds that “free trade is not fair trade” and is open in his disdain for the neocons: “These guys are so far to the left you think they’re on the right. It’s right out of the Communist International—exporting ideology at the point of a gun.” Concluded Boyer: “He almost seems a Pat Buchanan conservative.”

This is not really true, in that most Buchananites, and especially including my McLean, Virginia-based colleague (who has kept his own counsel about his vote last Tuesday) are serious cultural conservatives, for whom Webb’s pro-choice position and other more typical Democratic social-issue stands are likely or potential deal-breakers.

But it may be true that no successful politician is doing more to shatter the post-1960s categories of Left and Right than Webb is trying to do. If the present results hold, the Old Dominion has given us a vastly more complex senator than the oleaginous George Allen and perhaps its most interesting emissary to the upper chamber since the 19th century. ■

Are More “Thumpings” Needed?

While the losses were not large for the sixth year of a sitting president the significance of Nov. 7 is huge and the consequences will be historic.

But it is crucial to sift out what the nation was saying and what it was not saying. This election was a referendum on George W. Bush, the Iraq War, and the Republican Party, and undeniably a repudiation of all three. Tuesday's rout is what happens to a hubristic party that leads a nation into an unnecessary and unwise war and presents that nation with a congressional face of self-indulgence and corruption.

But the nation that rejected Bush and the Republicans did not reject conservatism. To the contrary, it seemed to want to punish the prodigal sons for abandoning the faith of their fathers.

What did America vote against?

It voted against Bush's war of democratic imperialism and the mismanagement of that war. It voted against Jack Abramoff, Duke Cunningham, and Mark Foley. It voted against a party that postures as conservative while indulging in a six-year pig-out on the taxpayers' tab, the altarpiece of which was a \$250 million “bridge to nowhere.”

What did America not vote against? It did not vote against tax cuts or conservative judges or a security fence. How do we know? Because no Democrat in a hotly contested race said he would raise taxes, reject Supreme Court nominees like Roberts and Alito, or grant amnesty for illegal aliens.

The principal beneficiary of the election may be Nancy Pelosi, but this election was no mandate for an ultraliberal feminist who spent much of the campaign in protective custody so Americans

would not see what they would be getting when they dumped Denny Hastert.

But if this was no mandate for a new “progressive era,” as the media are trying to portray it, what was it a mandate for? The answers are apparent.

The nation agrees with the Democratic Party that the minimum wage should be raised and a cost-benefit analysis done on Bush trade deals that leave Wal-Mart cluttered with cheap Chinese goods while hollowing out American manufacturing and converting company towns into ghost towns.

The open-borders crowd is chortling that Randy Graf and J.D. Hayworth went down to defeat but deliberately ignores the far more relevant fact that Arizonans voted even tougher restrictions on state benefits for illegal aliens.

In Michigan the GOP establishment deserted Ward Connerly's principled battle to end reverse discrimination. But while the GOP went down to defeat, the Connerly ballot initiative, rooted in the idea of equal justice under law for all races, swept to a 58-42 victory. When Republicans desert Reagan Democrats, Reagan Democrats desert the GOP. Which is as it should be.

On social issues, our national division that dates to the cultural wars of the '60s endures. Embryonic stem-cell research lost a huge lead to win a slim victory in Missouri while the toughest anti-abortion law in America went down to narrow defeat in South Dakota. But gay marriage was routed in seven states, and pot for medicinal purposes was rejected

in libertarian Nevada.

Yet the effect of the Republican rout on Bush appears to have been almost destabilizing. Within 48 hours, all the campaign bluster was gone and Bush was moving to accommodate his critics.

He fired and humiliated his loyal deputy Rumsfeld, told the new Mexican president he would fight for “comprehensive” reform of U.S. immigration law, i.e., amnesty and open borders, and had Nancy Pelosi down to the Oval Office, where she was treated as a queen, despite having portrayed the president as an incompetent ignoramus.

Coupled with what appears to be the outsourcing of Iraq policy to James Baker, Bush family consigliere, the questions arise, one after the other. Is there any real core to George W. Bush? Is there any real constancy of character and purpose? And do we have another broken presidency on our hands?

For conservatives the lessons of 2006 seem clear. They failed in their duty to hold the Republican Party to account when it departed from principle and political ethics and thus failed to rescue it from the rout it has now received. The Right failed in the basic responsibility of true camaraderie: friends don't let friends drive drunk.

What conservatives should do now is what they should have been doing for six years. Stand behind the president when he fights for low taxes and conservative judges. But when he joins with Pelosi, Fox, Calderon, and McCain-Kennedy for open borders, or with Dick Durbin for “moderate justices,” give him another “thumping” like he got from conservatives when he sought to elevate Harriet Miers and just as he got from the nation on Nov. 7. ■

Minority Report

Republicans bet the House—and the Senate—and lost.

By W. James Antle III

JIM WEBB'S SUPPORTERS were slow to trickle into the ballroom at the Sheraton Premier in Tysons Corner. Some jammed the lobby, hitting the cash bar and downing free egg rolls amidst balloons and pictures of their candidate. Others gathered around televisions tuned to CNN, straining to read the results flashing at the bottom of the screen. While it would be a while before they would get news about the Senate race they came to watch, the crowd cheered raucously each time the network called an election for the Democratic nominee.

"Surprise!" a group seated near the bar hooted when the announcement came that Republican Katherine Harris lost her long-shot Florida Senate bid in a landslide. Sen. Bob Menendez's (D-N.J.) early win also elicited an enthusiastic response. "That's a good sign," beamed a grandmotherly woman in a Webb t-shirt. "I think he had some kind of scandal issue." A middle-aged couple exchanged grins and clinked wine glasses.

As the night wore on, these Democratic Party activists would have plenty to celebrate—it was their best election in 12 years. Democrats easily retook the House, capturing many of the seats on their most wanted list. GOP incumbents Curt Weldon and Don Sherwood fell in Pennsylvania. Abramoff-tainted former House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-Texas), former congressman and convicted felon Bob Ney (R-Ohio), and disgraced ex-Congressman Mark Foley (R-Fla.) were all replaced by Democrats. Democratic gubernatorial candidates rallied in New York, Maryland,

Massachusetts, Ohio, Colorado, and Arkansas, giving the party a majority of the nation's governorships for the first time since 1995.

Democrats were disappointed in the contest for outgoing Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist's seat in Tennessee, but won close races in Montana, Rhode Island, and Missouri. Sens. Rick Santorum (R-Pa.) and Mike DeWine (R-Ohio) were trounced by double-digit margins. Vaunted Republican challengers Michael Steele of Maryland and Tom Keane Jr. of New Jersey fell short; no other GOP pickup attempt even came close. Finally, a day after the Sheraton Premier revelers headed home, the Associated Press declared that Webb had beaten Sen. George Allen (R-Va.), placing the Senate under Democratic control.

The Virginia Senate race may have been unusual due to the incumbent's large number of bizarre gaffes, but Webb was a Democratic candidate very much like the voters the GOP alienated—a former Republican who deserted the party over the Iraq War. According to nationwide exit polls, even voters who thought the economy was doing well but opposed the war favored the Democrats by a 2-to-1 margin. Iraq, big-government conservatism, and GOP corruption conspired to cost the Republicans their biggest advantages—the electorate's confidence in them to competently run national security, the government, and the economy.

As a result, 60 percent voted on the basis of national issues rather than local concerns; 57 percent of all voters opposed the Iraq War. Independent

voters swung Democratic by a 59 percent to 37 percent margin. CNN political analyst Bill Schneider told reporters, "We haven't seen that big a vote for one party among independents since exit polling began about 30 years ago."

Republicans only narrowly carried white men and lost white women. Their advantage on protecting Americans from terrorism only netted them 7 points. Evangelical Christians remained the GOP's strongest constituency, but even their backing slipped slightly from nearly three-quarters to about two-thirds. And Republicans lost more ground among voters who attend church services infrequently.

"If there was still any doubt," former House Majority Leader Dick Armey wrote in the *Wall Street Journal*, "the Republican Revolution of 1994 officially ended Tuesday night." Of course, the Republicans are still better off than they were before 1994. Even after this year's disastrous elections, they will hold six more Senate seats and as many as 30 more House seats than they did at the beginning of the 103rd Congress. But many of the factors that helped the GOP 12 years ago may have hurt the party in this election.

One of the biggest factors to come back to haunt the Republicans in this cycle was their over-reliance on the South. The region's realignment toward the GOP fortified Electoral College landslides by Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and George H.W. Bush. Southern and Border States are where Republicans won their congressional majority in 1994 and where they racked up the

margins that allowed them to keep it in subsequent elections. Despite the Sun-belt's growth, however, the region isn't sufficient to provide the GOP a national majority all by itself.

Republicans hemorrhaged seats in the Northeast, losing three in New York and four in Pennsylvania. Unless Congressman Rob Simmons (R-Conn.) prevails in a recount, his Nutmeg State colleague Chris Shays will be the only Republican congressman representing New England next year. Both moderate GOP congressmen in New Hampshire, the only state in the region with more registered Republicans than Democrats, were defeated. Other normally safe states outside the South were hostile territory. The GOP lost three seats in Indiana, two in Arizona, and one in Kansas.

Democrats may have reached the point of diminishing returns in the Northeastern corridor—defeating Shays in 2008 won't buy them much—but their gains in other regions should be troubling to Republican strategists. Governors who are even less popular than President Bush have caused the GOP to lose ground in Ohio and Indiana. Michigan and Pennsylvania are increasingly out of reach. And the Democrats appear to be making inroads in the interior West, as Montana, Arizona, and Colorado evolve into swing states. Even Dick Cheney's Wyoming is becoming problematic.

Conservative talk radio was another mighty force for the GOP in 1994. Combined with the proliferation of blogs and other conservative media, it should have been an even greater benefit this year. But the evidence suggests it was somewhat less helpful than it was a dozen years ago.

The claim that Rush Limbaugh's widely publicized criticism of Michael J. Fox—he accused the actor of dramatizing his Parkinson's symptoms in an ad praising the Democratic candidate's support for embryonic stem-cell

research—cost Jim Talent his Senate seat in Missouri is hyperbolic, but it is accurate to say that these comments didn't help. Yet that might not be the most important way in which Limbaugh and company colored this year's congressional races.

In 1994, talk radio provided the Republican opposition with a useful window into popular discontent. Except for clarifying which issues most irritated the GOP base—runaway federal spending and illegal immigration—it performed no such function this year. If anything, there was an echo-chamber effect that may have kept Republicans believing their own talking points and ignoring all the signs that they were in trouble. Consider how often one heard conservative commentators downplaying ominous polls, for example, based on the dubious argument that cell phones made polling obsolete.

Finally, the Republicans got little help from a culturally clueless Democratic leadership. For the most part, Democrats did not try to foist supporters of abortion, gay marriage, and gun control on socially conservative districts. Instead, they frequently ran candidates who imitated their Republican opponents on these issues, such as Heath Schuler in North Carolina and Brad Ellsworth in Indiana. Liberals at the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee eagerly backed candidates to their right, including pro-life Bob Casey in Pennsylvania and pro-gun Webb in Virginia. These Democrats may curb their party leaders' excesses on immigration, marriage, and taxes. Or they may capitulate and put their seats at risk in the next election cycle.

Refusing to adapt to new political realities, the GOP continued to follow its standard playbook and run against stereotypical liberals. Republicans tried the law-and-order issue in Maryland, where the Democratic gubernatorial candidate served as mayor in high-crime

Baltimore, and Massachusetts, where the last Democratic governor was Michael Dukakis of Willie Horton fame. Rep. Nancy Johnson (R-Conn.) tried the same tactic on terror, running ads accusing her opponent of being “wrong on security, wrong for America.”

Republicans lost all of those races because these talking points did not resonate with the swing voters they needed to win in otherwise Democratic-leaning areas—precisely the places where even the most liberal Republicans faced difficult terrain. Yet the party handled no issue more poorly than Iraq. Many candidates struggled to articulate their reasons for supporting the war—and candidates with particularly elaborate justifications concerning “Islamic fascism,” such as Rick Santorum, did not fare much better. The GOP issued press releases decrying “Defeatocrats” for wanting to “cut and run” rather than “stay the course”—and, eventually, “adapt to win.”

Such sloganeering eroded the Republicans' credibility on the war and detracted from their overall advantage on national security. Unfortunately, even many Republicans who bucked the party leadership on Iraq were caught up in the electoral tidal wave. Liberal Republicans Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island and Jim Leach of Iowa lost by slim margins; antiwar conservative John Hostettler from Indiana was defeated in a landslide. The paucity of Republicans who oppose the war in the next Congress—and the easy victory of liberal hawk Joseph Lieberman over Ned Lamont in Connecticut—complicates the building of a bipartisan antiwar movement.

Maybe the Republicans will make an effort to win back the voters Bush's policies cost them. But if not, the view from the Webb victory party suggests that the Democrats are perfectly happy to have them. ■

Chinese Takeout

Taming nuclear North Korea requires a regional effort led by Beijing.

By Doug Bandow

THREE WEEKS AFTER it appears to have joined the world's nuclear club, North Korea has confirmed that it will return to multilateral disarmament talks, a move that diminishes the likelihood of a second nuclear test. President Bush pronounces himself "pleased," though the *New York Times* reports, "behind closed doors at the White House and the State Department, some are less happy, saying the country's nuclear test should be answered with isolation."

Thus far, the Bush administration's reluctance to talk to Pyongyang has resulted in another embarrassing foreign-policy failure. But even as Washington proclaims its readiness for war against another member of Bush's axis of evil, armed conflict with North Korea is truly unthinkable. The U.S. would win, but the cost—to America, but even more so to South Korea—would be horrendous.

Diplomacy remains the strategy of choice, and what little hope is left of dissuading the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) from amassing a nuclear arsenal centers on China.

Beijing accounts for 80 percent of the North Korea's energy, provides it with substantial food aid, and is the isolated state's largest trading partner. Although the People's Republic of China has agreed to enforce recently passed UN sanctions, until now the PRC has feared North Korea's collapse more than North Korea's nukes. Even an erratic Pyongyang isn't going to use atomic weapons on China. Indeed, a nuclear DPRK benefits Beijing: it unsettles the U.S., demonstrating Wash-

ington's impotence; disrupts relations between South Korea and the U.S.; and constrains the use of American military power in northeast Asia.

On the other hand, an implosion of the DPRK—which could result from China applying too much pressure—would be quite costly. A violent disintegration and power struggle would have unpredictable consequences. Even a purely peaceful demise of Kim Jong-Il's regime could be messy. Millions of refugees might flood north, and such an onrush could act as social and ethnic dynamite in border provinces that already contain millions of ethnic Koreans.

Beijing also fears the geopolitical consequences of Korean reunification. Although relations between the South and China are good, the PRC does not want a unified Korea allied with the U.S. on its border. Precisely this prospect brought Beijing into the Korean War in late 1950 and animated a half-century-long alliance between the PRC and North Korea. While China almost certainly would not use force to prevent a South Korea-dominated reunification, it is equally unlikely to adopt policies that would encourage that outcome.

China's commitment to the North has not prevented some analysts from hoping for a miracle. Author Bruce Gilley offered what he termed an "immodest proposal" to solve the North Korean problem: "Beijing should invade North Korea on humanitarian grounds and establish a China-backed transitional regime there. The U.S. and its

allies in Asia should provide diplomatic and logistical support to the operation, while the U.N. should provide its legal blessing." The operation, Gilley proclaimed, "could be a clean-cut affair."

It would be more realistic to hope for an invasion of North Korea by Mars. It might be possible, however, to induce Beijing to take steps short of war that might change the DPRK's priorities. China could aim for the overthrow of North Korea's leaders rather than its system.

Beijing appears dissatisfied with the behavior of its troublesome ally and has repeatedly urged Pyongyang to participate in the six-party talks between the PRC, DPRK, U.S., Russia, South Korea, and Japan. In addition to brokering the latest resumption of negotiations, China warned North Korea against conducting its July missile tests and October nuclear tests. After the latter, China's UN envoy indicated that "bad behavior" should be punished, and Beijing voted for UN sanctions.

Effecting regime change would not be easy, even for China. Any attempt to remove Kim could trigger a violent power struggle or even civil war. Kim might survive—to China's obvious detriment—or the country could dissolve into bloody chaos.

Given these risks, the PRC is unlikely to act absent some assurance that it wouldn't be the primary loser if events go bad. For this reason, the best course the U.S. can take would be to suggest a less proactive course for China, backed by an American geopolitical guarantee.

First, China should strictly enforce the limited UN sanctions, particularly the ban on trade in luxury goods and weapons. Cutting off oil and food might bring Pyongyang to its knees, but that might spark the kind of violent national collapse that Beijing most fears. The humanitarian consequences could be equally serious. Moreover, the tactic might not work. Kim has proved willing to starve the North Korean masses, which have little ability to overthrow him. Change is only likely to come from action taken by the small circle of party elites and military commanders.

The model for regime change in North Korea is Romania, where communist elites took advantage of domestic unrest to oust Nicolae Ceausescu, rather than East Germany, where popular protests led to the downfall of party boss Erich Honecker. A palace coup might not deliver a reform-minded regime, but all that is needed is a deal-minded replacement for Kim, and Beijing's involvement is likely to deliver a more tractable government.

Kim and his allies, like other authoritarian regimes, use access to Western goods for control. He is apparently fond of Hennessy cognac and other quality liquors and beer; his wine cellar reportedly boasts 10,000 bottles. He enjoys fine foods—his former chef mentions caviar, lobster, melons, shark-fin soup, and sushi, as well as McDonald's hamburgers. Kim is also said to have given favorite family members and generals cars, camcorders, foreign-made suits, bidets, electronic games, fancy watches, gold pistols, jewelry, and foreign cash.

Restricting the nomenclatura's access to these fine products would severely undermine Kim's regime. Notes Aaron Friedberg of Princeton, "Kim rewards his underlings and ensures their loyalty by letting them share the loot. Kim's extended family, the top echelons of the Communist Party, and the upper ranks

of the military and security services all benefit from this arrangement."

Though 40 percent of North Korea's imports come from China, it is not the only player when it comes to restricting the regime's access to foreign luxuries. South Korea invests in and trades with Pyongyang but has been reluctant to interfere with cross-border contacts. Until recently the DPRK also had substantial economic ties with Japan and conducts commerce elsewhere in Asia.

To limit the DPRK's access to hard currency, China and other countries should not only restrict illicit behavior such as drug trafficking and counterfeiting but also curtail otherwise legitimate economic activities. This strategy would be aided by limiting the influx of North Korean "businessmen" and shrinking the number of local DPRK "diplomats," who often engage in commerce. The UN sanctions bar transit of those involved in weapons programs, but the limits should be tightened. This would penalize North Korea's privileged elite, starting with Kim, who travel abroad and educate their children overseas.

North Korea would be able to smuggle in some goods, but even a modest diminution of access to luxuries could increase hardship among North Korea's elite and foment domestic unrest. That, in turn, would encourage Kim's underlings to attempt his overthrow or to cooperate with efforts to oust him.

The PRC could also put pressure on North Korea by opening its borders to refugees. Although a totalitarian state, the DPRK has not sealed its northern frontier. To the contrary, North Korean citizens routinely escape into China after bribing border guards. "Money now trumps ideology for an increasing number of North Koreans," explained Peter Beck of the International Crisis Group to the *New York Times*.

Refugees began fleeing to China in 1983. North Korea's veritable economic

collapse, topped by mass famine in the late 1990s, greatly accelerated the exodus. An underground railroad has developed through which North Koreans are spirited out of their country with the aid of Christian missionaries, human-rights activists, and profit-minded brokers. Even though Pyongyang typically imprisons anyone it catches, by some counts the outflow has reached 400,000. Many have been captured; others have returned voluntarily. The U.S. government believes that 30,000 to 50,000 escapees remain in China illegally. About 9,000 have reached safety in South Korea and a few other countries.

As more North Koreans moved north, China sought to interdict what it calls "illegal immigrants, not refugees" more effectively. The PRC refuses to abide by any of the international agreements governing refugees or co-operate with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. To the contrary, Beijing works with North Korea, returning the refugees it catches. The *Christian Science Monitor* reports: "Along the border, China has heightened a two-year crackdown—with stepped-up house-to-house searches, leaflets warning villagers not to help, and bounties paid to informants."

Moreover, China is building a concrete and barbed-wire barrier along the two nations' 800-mile border. In the opinion of Kim Woo-jun of the Institute of East and West Studies in Seoul: "The move is mainly aimed at North Korean defectors," since Beijing expects that with the enforcement of the new UN sanctions "the number of defectors are likely to increase."

By discouraging refugees, China is propping up Kim's regime. One of the most destabilizing factors in Eastern Europe leading up to the fall of the Berlin Wall was the surge of refugees after Hungary tore down its "Berlin Wall" along the Austrian border. Encouraging a similar refugee flow from North

Korea could have an equally destabilizing effect. Pyongyang undoubtedly would attempt to tighten the border, but if the economy worsens, North Korean security personnel would become even more susceptible to bribery.

Washington has criticized the PRC for its heartless repatriation policy. Nevertheless, the West has done little to help Beijing bear the burden of a growing North Korean diaspora. Between 2002 and 2006 the U.S. granted asylum to only a couple dozen refugees. Last year American Ambassador Joseph DeTrani observed, “many of the countries in Southeast Asia have diplomatic ties with North Korea and are reluctant to cooperate publicly with the United States.” Even more incredibly, South Korea has been stingy. Two years ago Seoul reduced the benefits it pays to defectors and penalized brokers seeking to organize escapees. The unification minister explained that “we disapprove of the mass defections,” since “undermining the North is not our policy.” But undermining the North should be the policy of all of the DPRK’s neighbors.

The Bush administration should work with South Korea, Japan, and like-minded states to develop a program to ease Beijing’s burden in opening the border. South Korea, backed by the U.S. and countries throughout the Asia-Pacific region, should offer to accept substantial numbers of refugees. The issue should not be viewed as another immigration or asylum controversy but as a matter of national security.

The allied coalition, which ought to include the EU, should also promise to aid the PRC in the care of refugees who are not resettled. Although China’s economy is large and its growth rates are impressive, per capita income remains low. Since Beijing would be risking its political relationship with the DPRK, it could fairly request not to be left with the entire financial bill as well.

Before proposing that China confront its ally, Washington should offer an international guarantee of sorts indicating that it does not intend to take advantage of Beijing’s willingness to help. That is, the Bush administration should allay any Chinese concerns that America would bolster its regional influence at the PRC’s expense.

First, the U.S. should promise to recognize a new North Korean government and help to integrate it into the global economy as long as it negotiates an end to its nuclear program. (In the event that Beijing engineered regime change, the new government would likely follow the PRC’s lead in this regard.)

Second, Washington should promise to withdraw its troops from and end its security treaty with a unified Korea. In this way, a newly reunified Korea would not become an advance American military post on China’s border.

In fact, the U.S. troops should be withdrawn today, since the South is well able to defend itself from North Korea and South Korean and American geopolitical objectives have been steadily diverging. Indeed, South Korea has indicated that it will not allow the U.S. to use its forces in the region without Seoul’s consent, turning America’s presence there into an advanced base to nowhere. As Ted Galen Carpenter of the Cato Institute puts it, pulling out “simply involves relinquishing a waning strategic asset in return for something important.”

Washington would still retain extensive cultural and economic ties with South Korea. Moreover, a united Korea would still have a significant incentive to co-operate politically with America, in particular to help balance the influence of China and Japan. But Washington should make clear that the U.S.-South Korean relationship would not be directed against the PRC.

Why would China entertain such a proposal? The PRC-North Korea rela-

tionship, once described as close as lips to teeth, has grown distant, and the status quo is inherently unstable: DPRK irresponsibility could spark pressure for intensified sanctions, trigger war, or encourage nuclear proliferation to South Korea, Japan, and even Taiwan.

Helping to remove the Kim regime, in contrast, would stabilize regional relations while ensuring a friendly neighbor for the PRC. Beijing also would win the gratitude—presumably backed by more practical considerations—of Washington and its allies. That’s a bargain China’s eminently practical leaders are likely to consider.

American neoconservatives, on the other hand, look less willing to deal. *National Review*’s Rich Lowry writes, “In the case of North Korea, we have talked to our enemy, and it only has made him stronger. It’s time for action.” Bill Kristol adds in *The Weekly Standard*, “[T]he country cannot afford [Bush’s] all-U.N.-all-the-time defensive crouch. It is not too late to increase the size of the military; to work with Japan, rather than kowtowing to China, on North Korea...”

Should the negotiations fail to yield an immediate solution to the nuclear crisis—Kim does have a history of going back on agreements and walking out of the six-party talks—the war hawks will demand military action as the only alternative. Yet the best hope isn’t confrontation but an indirect strategy of undermining the DPRK’s ruling elite while China actively works to oust the dictator. There’s no guarantee that this will succeed, but given the results of our last attempt at forcible regime change, we cannot afford not to try. ■

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Battle for the Border

Grassroots activists push back against immigration enthusiasts—and prevail.

By Peter Brimelow

AMERICA'S IMMIGRATION disaster is looking increasingly like the other big Bush administration production, the war in Iraq. Immigration enthusiasts still occupy all the major power centers: the mainstream media, academe (although careful examination reveals that the labor-economist police battalion has been completely subverted by skepticism about immigration's value to the native-born), the leadership of both political parties. They can still launch offensives and win, at some cost, any pitched battle—exemplified this summer by the Senate's passage of S.2611, which combined amnesty for illegal aliens with an astonishing special-interest wish list that would have doubled or even tripled legal immigration, already at record levels.

But at the same time, and despite constant propaganda to the contrary, an extraordinary grassroots backlash has undeniably developed. This, and only this, is what has stalled the Senate's amnesty legislation, which never even made it to conference with the House. Of course, it's not over: experience teaches that the special interests benefiting from mass immigration have ways of making legislators talk—and vote. The setback, however, was stunning.

Immigration-reform institutions are developing too, independent of the political establishment, in a process very reminiscent of the 1950s-1960s institutional ferment that became the late, great American conservative movement and culminated in the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan. But what really

impresses me, as a long-time observer of the immigration-reform movement, is how often ordinary Americans are now spontaneously organizing in their neighborhoods against the transformation of their country. Illegal-alien demonstrations are now regularly picketed by anonymous citizens, something that requires real physical courage. The very diffuse nature of this phenomenon makes it difficult to monitor—or for the immigration enthusiasts to suppress.

Four years ago, reviewing Michelle Malkin's book *Invasion: How America Still Welcomes Terrorists, Criminals, and Other Foreign Menaces to Our Shores* in the first issue of *The American Conservative*, I paraphrased Tolstoy to the effect that all pro-immigration books resemble each other—triumphalist, rhapsodic about the author's foreign forbears, fatally data-free—whereas books critical of immigration policy are more diverse, usually specializing in quite different areas of this huge new debate, often earnestly technical.

Typical of an emerging paradigm, this remains very much true of this season's anti-immigration books. As for the pro-immigration books ... well, there don't seem to be many pro-immigration books at the moment. Commercial publishers, at least the less New York-oriented smaller ones, seem to have little doubt where the country's preferences lie.

Several of the new immigration-reform books provide little-known detail on recent grassroots firefights. In *Whatever It Takes*, Congressman J.D. Hayworth (R-Ariz.) reports that when

the California city of Baldwin Park erected a monument with Mexican revanchist slogans, a local group called Save Our State demonstrated against it. In *Minutemen: The Battle To Secure America's Borders*, Jim Gilchrist and Jerome R. Corsi report that when the tourist towns of Laguna Beach and San Juan Capistrano held parades that included illegal-alien groups and Mexican themes, the Minuteman Project, famous for its volunteer patrols on the border, applied to march in Revolutionary War outfits.

All were met with threatened and actual violence as well as intense hostility from local political elites, telling evidence of the extent to which the American government has become the enemy of the American nation. The Minutemen were actually blocked, to the great discredit of Laguna Beach and San Juan Capistrano. (Baldwin Park is now overwhelmingly Mexican and was just doing what comes naturally, albeit contrary to assimilationist advertising.) But the result seems only to be the further radicalization of the American patriotic resistance movement—for that is what this is.

Similarly, after years of being kept out of politics by a bipartisan Beltway consensus, in the 2006 election cycle the issue of immigration has spontaneously appeared in many federal, state, and local races. Minutemen founder Jim Gilchrist even got a remarkable quarter of the vote on a third-party line in a House special election in December, support for those of us who agree with the late Lyn Nofziger, the celebrated

Reagan operative, that immigration is one of those rare issues with the potential to break the two-party system.

The conclusion is unavoidable: the U.S. political elite appears dangerously close to losing control. Daniel Sheehy's *Fighting Immigration Anarchy* is a symbol and a symptom of this grassroots backlash. Sheehy is a former corporate writer who self-published this collection of profiles of key immigration reformers in 2005. He achieved so much success that it was reissued in revised form by a commercial house in mid-2006.

The profiles probably aren't of anyone you've heard about, with the exception of Colorado Republican Congressman Tom Tancredo. But they explain a lot of what is happening at immigration Ground Zero.

For example, back in 1993 Barbara Coe of the California Coalition for Immigration Reform was fired by the Anaheim Police Department, where she managed the Crime Analysis Unit, because she persisted in drawing to the attention of her superiors the dramatic increase in immigrant crime. Coe is a veteran of many subsequent demonstrations and the object of violence and death threats, which law-enforcement officials never seem to be able to do anything about. Her group has repeatedly put up billboards criticizing illegal immigration, which are invariably taken down by cowardly landlords after threats of violence. Instrumental in the victory of California's Proposition 187, which would have cut off taxpayer subsidies to illegal immigrants, she has been involved in several subsequent efforts to get immigration-reform measures on the ballot, all falling short of the required signature total partly because of the opposition, also cowardly, of California's Republican organizations.

She was 70 when Sheehy interviewed her and at work on another ballot initiative. She's been in the headlines more

recently because a Republican campaign staffer apparently used forged CCIR letterhead in a mailing warning Hispanic immigrants not to vote illegally. (Typical of current debate, this drew more outrage than the fact that Hispanic immigrants do often vote illegally.)

Her life of obscure sacrifice is one that appeals little to many professional politicians and even less to their media groupies. Nevertheless, it is the cumulative effect of many such lives that ultimately creates an irresistible political movement. St. Petersburg, notoriously, is built on the bones of the thousands of serfs who labored to reclaim the land from swamp.

Coe told Sheehy that her own radicalization dates partly from watching a destitute friend enter a low-cost nursing home, where she believes poor care from the non-English-speaking staff hastened his death. Documenting the devastating impact of radical demographic change on those unable to afford gated communities and private schools is a valuable contribution of Sheehy's book.

Sheehy himself opens with a lyrical account of the paradise that southern California appeared to him as a 12-year-old moving there in 1964—one year before Congress opened the floodgates with the disastrous 1965 Immigration Act—and his horror on returning a generation later to find it becoming Mexican urban wasteland.

Terry Anderson, the black radio-show host, showed Sheehy his once black neighborhood of South Central Los Angeles and says:

Thirty illegal Hispanics live in that three-bedroom house across the street. ... That house behind my house had lots of rabbits in the yard. They're raised for food. The other house behind mine had roosters. ... They have their parties and play their music loud. ... The black

family next door can't take it so they move. Well, who's going to buy the house next to these loud people? It's another Mexican family. ... And that's how they take over a neighborhood—house-by-house, block-by-block ... nobody wants to live next to them, and it's not for racial reasons, it's for cultural reasons.

Anderson rightly points out that city officials could stop this by enforcing zoning regulations. But they don't, apparently for political reasons.

This is very depressing. But it should actually be more depressing for immigration enthusiasts. It means that if some version of their wish-list legislation is passed, their political problems will not be ending but just beginning. The more immigration, the more backlash.

As Patrick J. Buchanan writes in *State of Emergency: The Third World Invasion and Conquest of America*, "Our great cities will all look like Los Angeles today. Los Angeles and the cities of the Southwest will look like Juarez and Tijuana. Though we were never consulted about this transformation, never voted for it, and have protested against it in every poll and referendum, this is the future the elites have prepared for our children."

This, of course, is a recipe for revolution. But my conclusion, from careful if not loving study of immigration enthusiasts, is that they quite genuinely have never thought about this inevitable outcome. Either they really believe their own Kumbaya claptrap or, as is frequently the case with die-hard adherents of putrefying orthodoxies, they just aren't very bright. Or both.

Buchanan's *State of Emergency* is the most intellectually ambitious synthesis of immigration arguments since (he said modestly) my own 1995 *Alien Nation: Common Sense About America's Immigration Disaster*, which Buchanan

acknowledges with his characteristic generosity and which he in effect has updated and replaced. (Well, except maybe for some boring economic stuff.) *State of Emergency* has been a huge success: on the *New York Times* bestseller list for five weeks with some 170,000 copies in print. Yet it has received virtually no print reviews—no *New York Times*, no *Wall Street Journal*, not even *National Review*, which has decayed into a mixture of neoconservative orthodoxy and Republican boosterism since Bill Buckley fired editor John O'Sullivan for publishing nativists like me.

My paranoid sense (sometimes justified—see previous sentence) is that what Buchanan calls “the elites” are now shaken by Americans’ immigration insurrection. Their instinctive reaction: to suppress debate. Hence no reviews at all—in marked contrast to Buchanan’s other recent books. (Similarly, at VDARE.com we’ve noticed a sudden jump in webfilters denying our readers access at work and in public places on the grounds that we are a “hate” site).

Needless to say, I don’t think that some cabal met somewhere and sent out the word that Buchanan’s arguments were not to be engaged. I think it’s more a matter of collective psychology—what Joe Sobran, looking at liberal intellectual lockstep, has called “the hive.”

This suppression would have been very effective 15 years ago. But to a significant extent, the combination of the Internet and Amazon.com has allowed Buchanan to bypass the would-be gatekeepers, as other conservative authors have been able to do. In this way, too, the immigration issue is slipping out of the American political elite’s control.

This instinct to suppress debate goes to the heart of the Bush administration. Incredibly, Hayworth reports that when he raised with Karl Rove some doubts he had about the Social Security totalization agreement with Mexico, which

allegedly co-ordinates both countries’ social-insurance systems, Rove “became somewhat exasperated and spluttered”—in a private meeting, to an elected official of his own party—“You just don’t want to help brown people, do you?”

The real question, of course, is whether the Bush administration wants to help Americans.

The answer, according to Jerome Corsi, is no. His collaboration with the Minuteman Project’s Gilchrist is not the definitive account of this remarkable civilian border-watch phenomenon and its unexpected public-relations success. (Corsi and Gilchrist are reportedly working on another Minuteman book.) Instead, it consists of various loosely woven but interesting strands—some Minuteman details, interviews with Gilchrist about his admirable combat service in Vietnam, and case studies, presumably by Corsi, of various aspects of illegal immigration’s impact and the authorities’ response.

One of these is Corsi’s widely-publicized discovery of documents apparently showing that President Bush has already committed the U.S. to a “Security and Prosperity Partnership” with Mexico and Canada—essentially extending the North American Free Trade Agreement into a North American Union, a full-blown common market along the lines of the European Union with free movement of capital, labor, and, ultimately, pooled sovereignty.

Ironically, this agreement was reached at the very same March 2005 meeting in Waco, Texas at which Bush notoriously dismissed the Minutemen as “vigilantes.” One can see how enforcing American law at the border must seem like a boring irrelevance if you have decided that the American and Mexican labor forces will shortly be merged anyway.

Of course, any such merger will be devastating to American workers and taxpayers—and to American democracy—but it

is the sort of thing that appeals to the shortsighted corporate interests with whom Bush appears to identify. And, after all, European governments did manage to hornswoggle their very reluctant historic nations into institutional merger. It’s as good an explanation as any for Bush’s extraordinary systematic refusal to uphold immigration law.

There is, however, the inconvenient detail that Bush did take an oath to uphold that law. If merger is actually his hidden agenda, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that he consciously forswore himself. And this, much more than any perjury about sex, calls out for impeachment.

America’s immigration-reform patriots still cannot mount main-force actions. No establishment-endorsed presidential candidate has dared to address the issue. But this leaves an intriguing vacuum for Congressman Tom Tancredo. He has become a national figure by talking about immigration and has self-deprecatingly positioned himself for a Gene McCarthy-style symbolic candidacy that could cause party managers a great deal of trouble.

Like his colleague, Congressman Hayworth, Tancredo has written an excellent book, *In Mortal Danger: The Battle for America’s Border and Security*. He provides a classic microcosmic account of the decision by bureaucrats at the Denver Public Library to convert several branches to a “bilingual”—which is to say, Spanish-language—format, complete with mandatory Spanish for all new staff. This revolution was carried through with relentless determination in the teeth of public opposition and, be it noted, immigrant indifference—at one focus group designed to foster support, only the two translators showed up.

Similarly, Tancredo notes March 2006 FBI testimony that the terrorist group Hezbollah has been implicated in alien smuggling from Mexico—striking, as he

says, because the FBI buried the testimony in an annual report and also because the mainstream media, committed to the official line that only busboys cross the southern border, ignored it. This underlines Tancredo's public vow that, if a terrorist attack occurs in the U.S. because the perpetrators were able to cross the border illegally, he will move to impeach his own president.

Extreme problems call forth extreme remedies. One of the constant themes of all these books is Hispanic activists' attitude of entitlement. J.D. Hayworth reports that in 2004, Lizabeth Ramon de Harvey was arrested for smuggling deported illegal aliens back into the U.S. while she was the live-in girlfriend of Phoenix assistant police chief Silverio Ontiveros and a member of the Phoenix Police Department's Hispanic Advisory Board—from which she refused to resign. (The Bush Justice Department allowed her to plea-bargain a one-year probation.) This arrogance will backfire, as it already has in the case of the mass alien demonstrations earlier this year.

Hayworth also laments immigration enthusiasts' ability to pervert the language so that Congressman Luis Guterrez can seriously object to the term "amnesty" because "there's an implication that somehow you did something wrong" and the *Wall Street Journal* can regularly describe critics of illegal immigration as "anti-immigrant." But Hayworth does not mention the obvious linguistic corollary: immigration enthusiasts have no loyalty to the historic American nation. What they are doing, in fact, can fairly be described as "anti-American." And there is a single word to summarize this, which needs to be reintroduced into contemporary debate. That word is: treason. ■

Peter Brimelow is the editor of VDARE.com and author of Alien Nation: Common Sense About America's Immigration Disaster.

Remains of the Day

"I will not withdraw even if Laura and Barney are the only ones supporting me."

—President George W. Bush

By Dennis Dale

THE FOLLOWING diary fragments were found by rebel forces of the breakaway American states near the ruins of President George W. Bush's secret bunker at the close of the Second Civil War in May 2008. The author is unknown, signing only his initials, "D.D."

Various explanations abound for D.D.'s identity, all of them entirely speculative, some wildly fanciful, such as the legend that he was an obscure "blogger," a phrase for dilettante as well as professional writers, political activists, exhibitionists, and others who used the Internet for self-publishing before the Consolidation and Control Act solidified the Second Republic's absolute control over the media, ushering in the Long Repression of the mid-21st century.

According to this legend, after abandoning his early opposition to the administration, D.D. became a fervent supporter in its last days and somehow, with the zeal and determination of a convert, managed to insinuate himself into the upper echelons of the Bush inner circle just as it descended into madness.

April 5

In the conference room I came upon the president, standing before a full-length mirror practicing facial expressions, looking back and forth from his reflection to a photo he had taped on the wall next to it. Startled to see me, he nonchalantly crossed his arms and leaned against the wall, his shoulder at an awkward angle to cover the picture.

"D____. Good morning. I was just, uh—what is it then?"

"I found that copy of *Rebel in Chief* you were looking for, sir." I handed him the dog-eared paperback. He took it from me enthusiastically. I pretended not to notice the photo of Winston Churchill that was now stuck to his shoulder.

April 12

The president called me into the command center. He had been leaning over a model of a city. He spread his arms in presentation.

"Well, what do you think?"

"Wow. I mean, yes sir, that's great." I had no idea what I was looking at.

"It's Baghdad," he said. "Look how peaceful and orderly it is. He leaned in close and pointed, "These are Iraqi security forces; see what a wonderful job they're doing? See the people? They're voting."

He looked up to confirm my enthusiasm. I spoke up to conceal my concern:

"What's that, sir?" The futuristic structure on the outskirts of the city was clearly out of place. It appeared to have been commandeered from the *Star Trek* diorama that had been a gift from Jonah Goldberg.

"That's the Bush Freedom and Liberty Mosque." He said, delighted. "It's going to be open to Muslims and Shi'ites alike. Let me show you where we're going to put the Wal-Mart—"

The temperature in the room suddenly dropped ten degrees. That could only mean one thing. "D____!" the vice president interrupted. "Come with me." He didn't wait before starting back

down the hall. The president returned to his model, engrossed. I followed the VP, careful not to get too close, into his quarters. Generals Pace and Casey were standing at attention before a table covered in maps.

"See this idiot?" the vice president said, pulling me into the room with what felt like a claw. "Look at him!" he thundered. There was an awkward moment as we stared dumbly at one another, the vice president holding me as if presenting a fresh kill.

"This moron can do a better job than you two!" He gave me a rough shake. Pace swallowed hard and ventured, "We just need another six months to turn this thing around, sir." His voice quavered on the verge of one of his legendary crying jags.

I'm starting to wonder what I've gotten myself into.

April 15

Today I found Ledeen bent over the Baghdad model. Using the toy *Starship Enterprise* from the Goldberg diorama he was pretending to strafe and bomb the city, spraying the besieged streets with spittle as he made explosion noises interspersed with the anguished cries of his imaginary victims. I discreetly moved on.

April 19

I sneaked out into the garden today to escape the drone of the ventilation system. It was incredibly peaceful there, shrouded in silence and a cool mist. It was such a remarkable contrast with what was going on inside that for a moment I actually believed the war wasn't real. I felt an immediate urge to escape the bunker right then and there. The impulse was so sudden and intense I was sure I wouldn't be able to resist. Then I heard something from the other end of the garden, a hushed voice.

Following the sound I came upon the president, bundled against the chill and

reclining in a lounge chair. He was facing away, revealing his profile but unable to see me.

He was speaking just above his breath, reciting the programmed phrases that had been the boilerplate of his speeches to the nation. He spat the words out as if he was trying to purge himself of them. Occasionally he would punctuate a sentence with one of his stock facial expressions. I couldn't help watching for a moment in horrified fascination before turning to go.

"Not exactly what you signed on for, is it?" he said sympathetically.

It was a voice that I didn't recognize; it was relaxed, unguarded, natural. I turned back to him. He was looking at me over his shoulder, the expression on his face as revelatory as his voice. It was as if he had been wearing a mask this whole time that was suddenly made evident by its absence. I was only now meeting the man. I stepped a bit closer, so I wouldn't have to speak up.

"I don't think any of us signed on for this, sir."

He smiled appreciatively.

"Well, sorry anyway." He turned away. Just as I was about to leave he said, "You know, I was almost baseball commissioner once."

I hesitated a moment. "You would've made a good commissioner, Mr. President."

He faced me, grinning a wan thanks, before looking down, lost in thought. Quickly, catching himself, he looked up and said, with a trace of the old bravado:

"No, I would've made a *great* commissioner."

I nodded and forced a grin. Turning to leave I was confronted by the First Lady; I stiffened and started to excuse myself. She silenced me with a light hand on my shoulder and ducked her face up under my lowered gaze.

"Thanks, D _____. Thanks for everything."

It was the first time she addressed me by name.

"Yes ma'am." I said, embarrassed. "I better get back inside now."

"Be careful." She said. "Dick is chewing out the guys from *The Weekly Standard*. You might want to steer clear of the conference room. Unless you'd like to see Kristol fling himself at the vice president's feet."

April 20

Everyone is in the command room. They're celebrating the VP's birthday; I'm not sure why—it isn't for a couple of months yet. I can hear them singing a forced, awkward "Happy Birthday" right now. I know exactly what the VP looks like at this moment: his thin, mirthless grin as he revels in the fear betrayed by their voices. I can see his beady eyes as they scan back and forth with reptilian satisfaction, obscured behind the reflection in his glasses of the terrified, contorted faces of the false revelers.

Now's my chance; I'm leaving the bunker. Barney has come in. He looks miserable, wagging his tail plaintively. He seems to understand.

"I gotta go, pal. Take care of yourself," I tell him, surprised to hear my voice crackling with emotion as I pat him on the head.

The grim, insincere singing, the sight of the dog's helpless, imploring eyes: I have no choice.

"Come on boy," I say. "Let's go home."

—D.D. ■

Dennis Dale's blog, Untethered, can be found at www.dennisdale.blogspot.com.

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
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
U.S. troop deaths

By month



Average daily insurance

By month




Car Bombs in Iraq

June 04	18
July	34
Aug	20
Sept	20
Oct 04-Feb 05	65
March	69
April	135
May	136
June	108
July	83
Aug	70
Sept	70
Oct	70
Nov	68
Dec	60
Jan 06	71
Feb	71
March	71
April	71
May	80
June	80
July	80
Aug	80
Sept	80

- Iraqis kidnapped per day: **30-40**
- Bodies received in Baghdad morgue per day: **50**

U.S. troops wounded in action

By month




- Literacy: **65%**
- Percentage of high-school aged girls enrolled: **35%**

- Unemployment
- Percentage of that has left s

e Numbers

Urgent attacks




nt rate: **48%**

f professional class
since 2003: **40%**

- Iraqi approval of attacks on U.S. troops: **61%**
- Iraqis "strongly opposed" to presence of U.S. troops: **82%**
- Iraqis who feel less secure because of occupation: **67%**
- Iraqis who believe Coalition forces are responsible for any improvement in security: **less than 1%**


U.S. troop strength in Iraq

By month



- Spent & approved to spend: **\$505 billion**
- Funds unaccounted for: **\$9 billion plus \$549.7 million in spare parts shipped to contractors**
- Halliburton overcharges classified by the Pentagon as unreasonable and unsupported: **\$1.4 billion**

Average hours of electricity in Baghdad per day



- Refugee and asylum seekers since 2003: **889,000; 36% Christian**

Sources: Iraq Index; The Brookings Institution; MCT; Department of Defense; icasualties.org

The Great Tory Hope

David Cameron aspires to be the Conservatives' Tony Blair.
But is that best for Britain?

By Peter Hitchens

A VERY STRANGE THING is happening in London. Political experts are once again talking of the possibility of a Conservative government. There is something close to excitement about the new Tory leader, David Cameron.

On the face of it, this is absurd. Millions of British voters would rather bar-becue their grandmothers than ever vote again for the Conservative Party. Irrational—and rational—loathing for the Tories has already kept them out of office for almost 10 years, and the normal cycle of politics in England appears to have been suspended. Mathematically and in other ways, a Tory victory is still most unlikely in 2009, the expected year for the next election.

Seduced by modern propaganda skills, soothed by apparent national prosperity and easy credit, or simply not interested in the old subjects of controversy anymore, a complacent electorate has confirmed Anthony Blair in office twice since he dispatched the last Conservative government in 1997.

This is not as startling a change as you might think. Britain has for some time had two left-wing parties, Labour and the Liberal Democrats, which long divided the radical vote and so allowed the Conservatives to win most elections under the first-past-the-post system. In 1997, their supporters discovered how to vote tactically for each other in close-fought districts, thus costing the Tories a significant number of seats in the House of Commons.

This is not all. Because of the cultural, educational, and moral changes they failed to resist in the 1960s and 1970s, Tories stopped passing on their values to their own children. Traditional conservatism as a disposition and a habit of the mind is disappearing among the British. Local party organizations are kept going by increasingly elderly survivors, and voters are dying faster than they can be replaced. In Scotland and Wales, meanwhile, the party of Margaret Thatcher has virtually ceased to exist as the old United Kingdom crumbles and Toryism is increasingly viewed as an English peculiarity.

Despite all this, new hope of a return to office is gathering round Cameron, a wealthy professional public-relations man who recently took up a career in politics.

This revival is an entirely managerial, professional phenomenon, devoid of any serious conservative political element. In fact, it is worse than that. It is based on a belief that conservative policies are a liability and that office can be obtained nowadays only by embracing the supposed center ground.

Cameron and his allies specifically and often brutally reject positions once closely associated with their party, and they deliberately stress their passion for causes their party once disliked or mistrusted. The Union flag, once waved with rather un-British enthusiasm at Tory conventions, was not even displayed on the platform of the most

recent gathering. (Labour's convention, by contrast, happily placed the national standard on its podium.) Mass immigration, an issue of great urgency, cannot be mentioned. Cameron has talked of his sympathy with "hoodies," menacing young men who lope around the streets of British cities in hooded jackets, looking like junior horsemen of the Apocalypse and creating justified unease among the respectable. He has adorned his expensive London home with a windmill to symbolize his love for the environment. And he recently affirmed his support for civil partnerships, a form of virtual marriage open only to homosexual couples.

There is also the matter of style. Cameron makes speeches that are indistinguishable from Blair's. Games are played in which the contestants try to guess which of the two has emitted a particular cloud of vapid platitudes. He has even spoken to friends of his desire to be "the heir to Blair."

Now 40, Cameron has been a member of Parliament for only five years. During that time he has supported the invasion of Iraq, urged the weakening of Britain's already feeble laws against narcotics, and done little else of note except refuse to answer questions about his own past drug use. He also appeared on the TV show "Friday Night With Jonathan Ross," a crude and witless interview program that—if shown in the U.S.—would disabuse Americans of any remaining illusions they may have about

the supposed majesty and quality of the BBC. During his encounter with Ross, the leader of the party of William Pitt, Robert Peel, and Winston Churchill submitted without protest to smutty, puerile questioning on whether he had teenage sexual fantasies about Margaret Thatcher.

A recent speech on foreign policy, in which he appeared to distance himself from the neoconservative stance embraced by his party some time ago, was cunningly nuanced—like much that Cameron does—to give a false impression of his true position. He knows that the neocon association is a liability. But the speech did not alter the party's ongoing support for the Iraq War or the increasingly questionable British intervention in Afghanistan. The prominent British neoconservative Michael Gove continues to be one of Cameron's closest advisers on this and other matters and appears quite undisturbed by his leader's behavior. Danny Finkelstein, a commentator for Rupert Murdoch's generally neoconservative *Times*, concluded rather cleverly that the speech "may be seen as distancing conservatives from neoconservatives. In fact it does nothing of the sort. Instead it was endorsing neoconservatism and then trying to distance it from the conduct of foreign policy by George Bush and Tony Blair."

In his former career as a corporate spokesman for a rather undistinguished commercial TV company, Cameron obtained a reputation for slipperiness in a world of very slippery people. Jeff Randall, one of London's leading business journalists, recently recalled, "To describe Cameron's approach to corporate PR as unhelpful and evasive overstates by a widish margin the clarity and plain-speaking that he brought to the job. ... In my experience Cameron never gave a straight answer when dissemblance was a plausible alternative,

Details of the Department of Homeland Security Bureau of Customs and Border Protection's latest proposal to regulate international travel have been emerging.

Homeland Security has asked the White House and Congress to approve a plan that would require all U.S. citizens to obtain prior approval before traveling internationally. The proposal, which has a targeted date for implementation of January 14, 2007, would require all air carriers, ships, and even commercial vessels like fishing boats to provide lists of passengers in advance to enable Homeland Security to determine if anyone on the list is blocked from entry into or exit from the United States. Something like this is already being done with air travelers, but the new program is a radical departure in that it would require that every traveler be positively cleared, whereas the current procedure only responds to "hits" and blocks a traveler if there are security concerns and he appears on a "no-fly list." The procedure will be administrative, but it will also be considered classified to protect the "integrity" of the travel-restricted lists, so the validity of its information cannot be challenged. Under the new procedure, even a U.S. citizen who has departed the country legally could be denied the right to return if Homeland Security either specifically denies that right or does not provide express prior permission. This suspension of travel rights is already being carried out administratively by Homeland Security in select cases, including earlier this year when Jaber Ismail, an 18-year-old native-born U.S. citizen from California, was denied re-entry into the States for six months while his case was being reviewed. Under the new regulations, it is not clear what the appeals process would be or whether an appeal would be allowed at all. The program will undoubtedly be challenged in courts, as it is unprecedented that a U.S. citizen should require prior clearance to travel, even in time of war. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that there is a constitutional right for U.S. citizens to travel internationally and also that it is an "unconditional personal right."



Yechezkel Wells, a Florida student, pleaded guilty on Oct. 24 to making a phony bomb threat after he called 911 at Long Beach Airport, near Los Angeles.

Wells claimed that he had arrived at the terminal on Aug. 26 too late to clear security for his flight so he made the call, hoping to delay the departure so he could board. Instead, the airport was shut down while the plane was searched. Wells will be sentenced on Jan. 29 and faces a punishment that can range from probation to five years in prison. The FBI reportedly has kept the case open as Wells, an Israeli citizen who claims to be a student but does not appear to be registered for a course of study anywhere, is suspected of working for Israeli intelligence in some capacity. If it is determined that he might be from Mossad, he will undoubtedly be quietly deported on immigration charges to avoid embarrassing the Israeli government.

Philip Giraldi, a former CIA Officer, is a partner in Cannistraro Associates.

which probably makes him perfectly suited for the role he now seeks: the next Tony Blair.”

The story of how this curious individual became the great hope of British political conservatism has yet to be properly told. During the contest for the Tory leadership last year, Cameron was not—at least to begin with—seen as a serious contestant. He had no important political experience. Yet he somehow acquired the significant support of many in the British media, who greatly overpraised a speech he made and were excessively cruel about a speech made by his main rival, the more traditional conservative David Davies. Space does not permit me to speculate here on the reasons for this, interesting as they are.

Some attribute Cameron's success to the operation of a still potent old-boy network. The son of a wealthy stockbroker, he had been educated at Eton College, an expensive school so closely

joined the Bullingdon, a rich boys' drinking club once satirized by Evelyn Waugh as the “Bollinger” in *Decline and Fall* and still trying to keep alive a pathetic fantasy of pre-1914 aristocratic rakehell behavior. Its braying, landed founders were in fact even worse than their modern imitators. They would have scorned a stockbroker's son as “trade” and thrown him into the nearest fountain after depriving him of his trousers.

And while Blair took a rather poor law qualification—we are not allowed to know his official grade—Cameron stayed sober enough to win a first class degree in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. I should say that Cameron is by far the brighter and much more knowledgeable about history. This shows when the two have their weekly verbal pillow-fight in the House of Commons. There, Cameron often does well—but not always. He was wholly useless a few weeks ago when the British army's dis-

about Saddam's weapons because they wanted to. Thanks to their inability to escape from this mistake, Cameron missed one of the great Parliamentary opportunities of his life. The general, who under any previous government would have been fired on the spot for interfering in politics, has kept his job because he is so obviously right and because Blair is now too weak to get rid of him.

Yet that weakness has not benefited the Conservatives all that much. Before the Tory collapse, when Britain had a proper two-party system, Blair's troubles would have resulted in a surge of support for the opposition party. But all opinion surveys show that around 35 percent of voters are now so disaffected that they either refuse to say which way they will vote, don't know, or have given their backing to minority parties such as the United Kingdom Independence Party, which has taken up almost all the policies once associated with the Tories but now dumped by them.

The poll summaries tend to leave out the army of the disgusted and so overstate what appears to be a modest Tory lead, nothing near enough to guarantee office in 2009. But even these figures may exaggerate Cameron's advance and may underestimate his problem in mobilizing his own side while wooing those who despise his party. At a recent special election to replace a deceased Tory member of Parliament, the Conservative vote shriveled so badly that the party almost lost one of its safest House of Commons seats. What a strange nation Britain has become, in which—under one of the worst governments and worst prime ministers in living memory—the voters register a protest against the main opposition party and its leader. ■

Peter Hitchens is a columnist for the London Mail on Sunday. He is the author of The Abolition of Britain.

THE TORIES, ASHAMED OF HAVING DELIVERED THE COUNTRY TO RULE BY THE EUROPEAN UNION, ARE OFTEN ANXIOUS TO APPEAR NOISILY PATRIOTIC WHEN THE GUNS BEGIN TO SHOOT.

associated with toffee-nosed aristocratic languor that its very name can inflame ancient passions of class hatred among Britons. Since the cultural revolution of the 1960s, such a background has generally been seen as a drawback in a political career—not that he had shown very much interest in politics at the age when such things usually appear, while he was a student at Oxford University.

In this Cameron is again very like Blair, who has always been thought to have had no political affiliations during his time at Oxford. But while Blair used up his energies as the Mick Jaggeresque lead singer in a rock band, Cameron

tinguished and decorated chief of staff, Gen. Sir Richard Dannatt, openly suggested that it was time for British troops to leave Iraq and added that Britain needed to rediscover its Christian roots if it wanted to resist militant Islam. The unelected, nonpolitical general had suddenly articulated national feeling better than the official leader of the opposition.

Cameron was quite unable to take advantage because of his own past support for the war. The Tories, ashamed as they are of having delivered the country bound and gagged to rule by the European Union, are often anxious to appear noisily patriotic when the guns begin to shoot and believed the feeble rubbish

Return of the Native

The Left begins to recognize that it can't simultaneously fight for its working-class base and the multicultural agenda.

By Kara Hopkins

THE EDITORS of *The Nation* are confounded. "What's Fueling the New Nativism?" they asked. Their readers answered: we are.

"The roots of this xenophobic upsurge—fueled by economic frustrations and national-security phobias, and inflamed by voices of hatred—run far too deep ..." claimed the lead editorial of the Aug. 28 issue. (They were not discussing some sudden proliferation of KKK rallies but recent immigration-reform efforts.) "[N]o one could have foreseen the breadth and fury of the new nativism that has risen up from Middle America with an ominous roar."

Neither, apparently, could the old baron of leftist opinion have foreseen the breadth and fury of its audience's reaction. The Nov. 13 issue confesses to "an avalanche of furious mail":

"All who oppose illegal immigration are not right-wing racist extremists," a North Carolinian chastised the editors. "I myself am black. And those of us in the lower depths are definitely negatively affected—not only by the downward pressure on wages but by the fact that a requirement for many jobs now is the ability to speak Spanish!" Another reader responded, "Your characterization of people who are anti-illegal immigration as racists is unfair and untrue. Like myself, most are just working stiffs. I'm a plumber, trying to hold on to my job and a way of life I grew up with." Another went further: "By labeling concerns of American workers 'nativism,' you dismiss those concerns as reac-

tionary or invalid. Characterizing those concerns as racist or xenophobic allows you to ignore the economic impact on the working class while gallantly mounting your high horse in defense of the oppressed minority you prefer to focus on."

That's the flashpoint of the conflict, and Democrats' answer will define their political fortunes. The party long perceived as fighting for the little guy has taken on new charges whose demands increasingly clash with the interests of its historic base. Their discontent—dismissed as prejudice—is a legitimate reaction to being forsaken as the Left attempts to force broad populism, its most reliable electoral asset, into a narrow multiculturalist mold.

Populism is one of the more elusive themes in American politics—and in terms of electoral utility, one of the most potent in this country without kings. From the earliest days when patriots served tea and treason in Boston Harbor, deep in the national DNA runs a satisfying view of ourselves as combative idealists taking the fight to outsized opponents. Those who tap that current touch something primal—and for decades the Democrats did.

Drawing an urgent divide between "two great classes—tramps and millionaires" in the dust of westward expansion gone bust at the close of the 19th century, the People's Party platform surveyed the dark side of prosperity and found a "nation brought to the verge of moral, political, and material ruin."

These Populists—so called by an Ohio editorialist—failed to triumph under their own power. But they sufficiently defined an American sympathy to siphon one million votes and cost Republican President Benjamin Harrison re-election.

When the "Great Commoner" William Jennings Bryan ran the next cycle, the Populists sold out for free silver, and both lost. Populism would enjoy no revival as an organized political force—in pure form it is too easily caricatured as anti-capitalist, much as the original intent ran counter to the Marxist dream, arguing not for abolition of private property but for its protection against corporate consolidation. But the Democrats had acquired a political code key. From Franklin Roosevelt's "economic royalists" to "Give 'em hell" Harry Truman, fanfares for the common man became whistle-stop vogue. In rhetoric if not in action, Democrats were able to define themselves as champions of the producers versus Bryan's "idle holders of idle capital" and reaped political dividends from FDR to LBJ.

But then the populist persuasion began to undergo a near fatal mutation from which it has yet to recover. In 1964, George Wallace took to the national stage burnishing familiar credentials by blasting "eastern money interests" and "bearded bureaucrats." But he tweaked the old formula by refocusing "us versus them" to segregation's advantage: his little guy was white. By the time Wallace left the party—taking 10 million votes

with him—he had translated populism from economic to social terms, breaking Democrats' grip on working-class whites in the process. Toiling in the civil-rights vineyard, the Left anticipated a replacement constituency even as they too redefined roles—in reverse. Those on the lower rungs of the economic ladder previously designated “the people” were now cast as “the powerful” because of the color of their skin.

Sensing a constituency in play, Republicans sought to win them over with familiar lines, sampling populist tropes with Nixon's Silent Majority. Reagan went further, again recasting antagonists by mapping the battle as citizens against big government. But their fidelity to free trade and their corporate sponsors' desire for cheap labor made the Republicans imperfect vessels. Reagan's successor fell victim to a populist one-two punch: his own perceived aloofness and another third-party candidate—19 million votes this time.

Clinton's “Putting People First” campaign rode through the middle. A sour economy suggested a return to populism's roots, and he got the rhetoric right: “I expect the jetsetters and featherbedders of corporate America to know that if you sell your companies and your workers and your country down the river, you'll be called on the carpet.” But as president he showed more interest in turning down the Lincoln bedroom covers for the rich and famous.

His ossified veep struck a populist pose and failed to convince, losing two-to-one among white men. Neither would Teresa Heinz's husband prevail: only 38 percent of swing voters thought Kerry seemed like a “real person.” But Texas folksiness only goes so far. With scant daylight between Bush and the Democrats on globalism and government growth, populism had to be refitted. Thus Republicans channeled the

impulse against cultural captains of industry—“media elites” in talk-radio speak. The old strain was officially buried.

The Left will spin its recent electoral success as a glorious revolution, but voters were far more interested in Bush's war than fulminations about the minimum wage. Democrats have no agenda and are unable to raise the old standard at full strength.

Most of their candidates are distant from the common men they claim to represent, and many aren't immune to the socialist tendency that has always been populism's undoing. More critically, after Republicans joined them on civil rights, Democrats crawled out on the multicultural limb to maintain their supposed monopoly on public virtue. In so doing, they became a new breed of oligarchs, using powerful institutions and the cudgel of political correctness to enforce an artificial state of affairs. Thus, when they speak of trade they employ the vague language of human rights rather than American equity. And when they bring themselves to mention immigration, it's to indict populists like CNN's Lou Dobbs for “hysteria and jingoism” as *The Nation* did.

But they have lost touch with the philosophy that yielded four decades of majorities. In 1892—electoral high tide for the People's Party—key to their platform was the realization that “imported pauperized labor beats down wages.”

These new elitists have also lost touch with the country. Polled earlier this year, 81 percent of Americans said that immigration policy is “out of control,” and 68 percent felt that the current level of immigration—legal and illegal—is “too high.” Not all of these can be xenophobes. After all, some of them read *The Nation*.

That realization has landed at other outlets of liberal opinion. *The New Republic's* Peter Beinart writes, “In the

coming years, unless Democrats take a hard line on immigration, their hard line on trade is unlikely to do them much electoral good. Economic nationalism may offer the Democratic Party its best chance in decades for an enduring reconciliation with the white working class.”

The good news for Democrats is that field is open. Republicans cannot capture the populist flag. Their diversity play involves immigrants themselves. Besides, their deep pockets demand a docile workforce while their intellectual wing argues that freedom requires an unchecked flow of goods and people. But they understand populism's appeal enough to mint their own version, which succeeds in the absence of legitimate challenge.

Thus far the Left has been unable to answer. Between a resurgent faith in the old tenets of the populist creed and electoral success on their own terms sits the conflict that shocked *The Nation*. As a political calculation, it makes no sense to trade an established base for an imagined cloud of gay, feminist, Hispanic, and otherwise culturally correct witnesses. For as long as diversity is enthroned as the highest political good, concern for Joe Six-Pack cannot be primary. Worse, these average Americans who were once Democratic faithful are being antagonized by the condescension that deems their natural attachments hateful.

The question the Left must answer, therefore, is whether concern for foreigners outweighs loyalty to citizens, for the American minorities they claim to protect are most vulnerable to the flood of unskilled labor. That is their entry point into the immigration debate and the first step back to authentic populism. But first, they may need some time to recover from the revelation that they have been leading a long column of racists. ■

Democracy Takes a Village

E.F. Schumacher argued that the cult of bigger is better has deformed our politics as well as our sense of economy.

By Joseph Pearce

To the size of states there is a limit as there is to other things, plants, animals, implements; for none of these retain their natural power when they are too large or too small, but they either wholly lose their nature or are spoilt.

—Aristotle

“IT’S HARD TO EQUAL the language of the ancients,” E.F. Schumacher remarked after quoting the above words. Echoing Aristotle’s wisdom, he reiterated his belief that “the question of the proper scale of things” was “the most neglected subject in modern society.”

Since Schumacher’s *Small Is Beautiful* was published a third of a century ago, millions of copies have been sold in many different languages. Few books have had such a profound influence on the way the world perceives itself.

The respected economist broke ranks with the accepted wisdom of his peers to warn of impending calamity if rampant consumerism and economic expansionism were not checked by human and environmental considerations. Like a latter-day prophet, he asserted that humanity was lurching blindly in the wrong direction, that the pursuit of wealth could not ultimately lead to happiness, that the pillaging of finite resources and the pollution of the planet were threatening global ecological collapse, and that a renewal of moral and spiritual perception was essential if disaster was to be avoided.

People, he argued, could only feel at home in human-scale environments. If structures—economic, political, or social—became too large, they became impersonal and unresponsive. Under these conditions individuals felt functionally futile, dispossessed, voiceless. Structures that have a genuinely human scale reveal a healthy culture, to use Wendell Berry’s language, that is part of an order of “memory, insight, value, work, conviviality, reverence, aspiration. It reveals the human necessities and the human limits. It clarifies our inescapable bonds to the earth and to each other.”

After *Small Is Beautiful* was published, Schumacher received a letter that explained the challenging problem of scale from an organizational point of view:

The crucial point is that as a monolithic organization increases in size, the problem of communicating between its components goes up exponentially. It is generally reckoned that the maximum size of a productive scientific research team is twelve; over that size everyone spends all his time finding out what everyone else is doing.

If this point is valid, and Schumacher clearly believed that it was, its implications are manifold. At the beginning of chapter 5 of *Small Is Beautiful*, titled “A Question of Size,” Schumacher discussed the political implications associated with scale. He had been brought up

to believe that the politics of scale were as powerful as the economies of scale. Such was the dogmatic assertion that the politics of scale were inexorable and inevitable that history was seen as being determined by them. According to this view, human society began with the family; then families joined together to form tribes; then several tribes formed a nation; then a number of nations formed a “Union” or “United States”; finally, the consummation of the entire process would be the formation of a single world government. This concept of political determinism could be called the theory of progressive centralization.

Schumacher confessed the apparent plausibility of such a line of reasoning but questioned its ultimate validity. If the process were as inevitable as its proponents claimed, why was there such a proliferation of nation states? Schumacher cited the example of the United Nations. When it had been formed it had some 60 members. Twenty-five years later, when Schumacher was writing, this number had more than doubled and was continuing to grow. The phenomenon has continued apace, most notably of course with the break-up of the Soviet empire.

Schumacher had been brought up on the theory that a country had to be big in order to be prosperous—the bigger the better. Winston Churchill had derided “the pumpnickel principalities” of Germany prior to the birth of the Bismarckian Reich. It was only through unification under Bismarck that German

prosperity was possible. At least that's how the theory goes. But Schumacher offered a cautionary counterstance: "the German-speaking Swiss and the German-speaking Austrians, who did not join, did just as well economically, and if we make a list of all the most prosperous countries in the world, we find that most of them are very small; whereas a list of all the biggest countries in the world shows most of them to be very poor indeed. Here again, there is food for thought."

Nonetheless, and in spite of voices such as Schumacher's, it is still often believed that big is best in politics and that Balkanization is bad. This view has been strengthened by the bloodshed in the Balkans itself in the last decade of the 20th century. From the security of stable political environments, whether in large or small nations, it is easy to deride as primitive or bigoted the issues that divide less stable areas. "Why can't everyone live in peace?" is a pertinent question, but it is all too often asked only as an exasperated exclamation at the perceived ignorance of others.

IN THE PAST CENTURY THE **THREE POLITICAL LEADERS** WHO WERE MOST **OBSESSED WITH CENTRALIZING POWER** AND WITH EMPIRE BUILDING WERE **STALIN, MAO, AND HITLER**. THE RESULT, APART FROM THE ABJECT FAILURE OF THEIR CENTRALIST BELIEFS, WAS THE **MURDER OF MILLIONS OF PEOPLE**.

Why then is the world so riven with conflict? Ironically, it is due in large part to the theory of the politics of scale. Balkanization, so derided by those who believe big is best, is actually the consequence of the politics of scale that they espouse. The problem is caused by those who most vociferously and patronizingly condemn it. Take, for example, the many conflicts that have erupted in the Balkans. They have been due principally

to the earlier attempt to fuse Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Albanians, and other nations into an artificially large state called Yugoslavia dominated by the Serbs. Yugoslavia's former dictator, Marshal Tito, could only prevent the mounting ethnic tension from spilling over into violence by keeping order with an iron fist. After his death in 1980 the various nationalities began to flex their democratic muscle, demanding autonomy.

The same problem was caused, on a much larger canvas, by the politics of scale adopted by the Soviet Union. Lenin and Stalin centralized political power in Moscow, annexing or invading neighboring nations. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Tadjikistan, and many others were swallowed up by Soviet political giantism. Beyond the Soviet border, Stalin consolidated communist power by forcing most of Eastern Europe into the Soviet empire. It was all part of the inexorable march to communist world government, or so Stalin believed. The peoples of the communist empire had other ideas. Preferring the beauty of their own small

nations to the power of the Soviet bloc, they began to fight for their independence. One by one the nations of the former Soviet empire seceded, toppling the largest and most powerful political empire on earth. All this has happened since Schumacher's words were written, vindicating his observations.

Of course, theories of the politics of scale and progressive centralization are not the sole preserve of communism.

The efforts of the imperial powers to consolidate their empires drove artificial frontiers through the ancestral territories of the African tribes. The great Masai nation was divided between Kenya and Tanzania. Similarly, a line was drawn through Somalia, separating part of the Somali people from their brethren and placing them inside Kenya. The result of imperialist meddling in Somalia, as in so many other parts of Africa, has been anarchy, war, and famine.

In recent years the role of empire builder in Africa has passed to the United States, whose colonialist impulse surfaced in Somalia in 1991. At first American intervention was ostensibly humanitarian, concerning itself with delivering food to famine-stricken areas. Soon, however, Operation Restore Hope had been transformed into a military operation, dubbed Operation Nation Build. Its purpose, however, had precious little to do with helping to rebuild the Somali nation, as the words of the U.S. ambassador in Somalia made plain: "There is no more Somalia. Somalia's gone. You can call the place where the Somali people live 'Somalia,' but Somalia as a state disappeared in 1991." It is unclear with what international authority the American ambassador declared the right to announce the destruction of Somalia, but to the Somali people the words of Uncle Sam must have sounded suspiciously like those of Big Brother. Either way, the U.S.-led military invasion failed to bring peace or stability, resulting instead in greater depths of anarchy and bloodshed.

The most telling condemnation of the politics of scale is to be found in those who took it to its logical extreme. In the past century the three political leaders who were most obsessed with centralizing power and with empire building were Stalin, Mao, and Hitler. The result, apart from the abject failure of their centralist beliefs, was the murder of mil-

lions of people in the name of ideological "progress."

Since the legacy of political giantism in the 20th century leaves much to be desired, what then is the alternative? Essentially it is that the principle of small is beautiful must apply to politics as much as to economics. Whereas believers in big is best look towards the evolution of ever larger, supranational political bodies to govern humanity, those who seek the human scale in human affairs call for devolution of power to smaller nations or to regions or states within nations.

Schumacher insisted that the question of "regionalism" was one of the most important problems facing humanity:

But regionalism, not in the sense of combining a lot of states into free-trade systems, but in the opposite sense of developing all the regions within each country. This, in fact, is the most important subject on the agenda of all the larger countries today. And a lot of the nationalism of small nations today, and the desire for self-government and so-called independence, is simply a logical and rational response to the need for regional development. In the poor countries in particular there is no hope for the poor unless there is successful regional development, a development effort outside the capital city covering all the rural areas wherever people happen to be.

In economic terms the regional development to which Schumacher is referring is linked to the application of intermediate, or appropriate, technology. In political terms it refers to the establishment, or re-establishment, of genuine small-scale local and regional self government. It is a call for the re-emergence of genuine democracy.

Since democracy is a political dogma

to which most governments in the world claim allegiance, it is necessary to differentiate between nominal democracy and the genuine article. Nominal democracy, the form practiced in many of the world's largest countries and in supra-national bodies like the European Union, works more in theory than in practice. At best it is inefficient and inadequate; at worst it is little more than a sham.

The purpose of democracy for the inhabitants of the ancient Greek city-states was to give a voice to every free citizen not merely in principle but in practice. This was possible because the city-states were relatively small and because not every inhabitant was a citizen—some were slaves who had no political rights. Nonetheless, in ideal terms, pure democracy exists when the principle is incarnated into practice as it was in ancient Greece. Citizens should be their own representatives with both the theoretical right and the practical ability to express their views and influence their community.

Problems arise when societies become more complex or merge into ever larger political units. When the politics of scale apply there is little option for individuals but to delegate their democratic functions to a local council; the local council delegates its functions to a county council; the county council delegates to the regional council or state government; the regional council or state government delegates to the national government; the national government delegates to a continental union; and finally, so the theory implies, the continental union will delegate to a world government.

To what extent will the individual be able to influence a world government? Each of us is but one voice in an electorate of several billion. Clearly our democratic function will only exist as an abstract theory, leaving us with no practical ability to influence the society in

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which we live. Seen in this light, the theory of progressive centralization is, in relation to democracy, the practice of progressive usurpation.

This whole issue was discussed with polemical power by John Seymour, doyen of the self-sufficiency movement, in *Bring Me My Bow*. In a chapter entitled “The Horrible Disease of Gigantism,” Seymour let rip rhetorically against those who have usurped power in the name of democracy:

What is the cure for this beastly disease of gigantism? Break ‘Great Britain’ and the other huge nation-states up again. What do we want to be ‘Great’ for any more? I don’t want to be ‘Great’—I want to be wise, I want to be free, I want to be kind, I want to be happy. In what did our ‘Greatness’ consist anyway? In beating other people up and then saying to them: ‘Look—we’re the bosses of the Greatest Empire the World has ever seen!’ Did this make the average Englishman wise, free, kind and happy?

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Seymour’s robust denunciation of imperialism was motivated by a profound commitment to genuine democracy: “The unit which is small enough for every man to make himself personally heard is the only unit that can possibly claim to be a democracy.” Seymour’s democratic sensibilities and his belief in the break-up of Great Britain led him to dismiss the two major parties as intrinsically tied to theories of “gigantism”: “Fortunately, because I live in Wales, my choice is clear. I shall vote for Plaid Cymru, the devolutionist party. My men will not get in, but at least my tiny little voice will be heard, speaking out in favor of a country of humane size.” These words were written in 1977 when devolution seemed little more than a distant dream held by a few eccentric nationalists. Today Plaid Cymru has emerged as a major force in Welsh politics, and devolution, albeit only in a partial and emasculated form, has become a reality.

Yet Seymour, though he lived in Wales at the time, was an Englishman who loved his own country. England, like Wales, was distinct from Great Britain and should be liberated from it. Seymour, however, went still further: “I have another sort of pride, more private, more intimate, more my own perhaps, and that is in being an East Anglian. Ah, there could be a country! And to be a countryman of East Anglia would in no way lessen my pride at being an Englishman. ... East Anglia is a nation, and as large as any nation ought to be.”

Seymour’s characteristic candor will lead many to deduce that he is little more than a short-sighted romantic, and clearly it is questionable whether the concept of “nation” could be applied to areas such as East Anglia. Yet his call for power to be devolved from central government to smaller regions is valid. He was also enough of

a realist to pre-empt the objections of the believers in realpolitik who insist that the politics of scale make small nations, or other forms of small-scale government, impractical in the “real world”:

Now I must brace myself for the counterblast from the people who always say, at this juncture of this particular argument: ‘What we want is not more nations but fewer! We want to do away with nations altogether in fact. All men should unite in one nation, the nation of the world!’ ... Surely it can be seen that one government for the whole world, one all-embracing nation would be about as far from real democracy as you could get? If a man cannot make his voice heard in England how the hell is he going to make it heard in the world? Among—what is the latest guess: four thousand million people—how much is the voice of one honest man going to count? If there is ever a government of the world you can be sure of this: it will be despotism, not only the biggest but also the most despotic.

If, however, this theoretical world government should ever become a reality, it will almost certainly call itself a democracy. People will have a vote even if they don’t have a voice. The problem, therefore, is not whether democracy is the way forward—almost everyone believes that it is—the problem is undemocratic “democracy.” The challenge for the future is how to make democracy democratic. ■

Joseph Pearce is writer in residence and associate professor of literature at Ave Maria University. This essay is adapted from Small Is Still Beautiful (ISI Books 2006).

Arts & Letters

FILM

[Borat]

Polish Joke for a New Century

By Steve Sailer

ENGLISH IMPROVISATIONAL comedian Sacha Baron Cohen first broke through with his striking concoction Ali G, the British-born Pakistani nitwit with a bling-laden, canary-colored tracksuit and an Andy-Capp-meets-Snoop-Dogg vocabulary. Ali G posed as a news personality popular with “the yoof,” enabling him to ask smart people imbecilic questions. In one memorable interview on his HBO show, our own ever gracious Pat Buchanan gallantly (and effectively) parried Ali’s queries about why America hadn’t found “any BLTs in Iraq” and “Is it ever worth fighting a war over sandwiches?”

Ali G functioned as a brilliant satire on the neoconservative dogma that any problems caused by mass immigration will automatically disappear due to the magic of assimilation. While Ali G was, as promised, wholly assimilated into English culture, it was not the England that gave us Shakespeare and Locke but the lowest common denominator Cool Britannia of council estate chavs from the unworking class.

Eventually, every publicist in the English-speaking world was warned about Ali G, so Baron Cohen has now been forced to fall back on his less inspired secondary character, Borat, a grinning idiot of a TV reporter from a phenomenally backward Kazakhstan. The Min-

istry of Information sends the likeable lunkhead to report on the “U.S. and A.” in the hit mockumentary “Borat: Cultural Learnings of America for Make Benefit Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan.”

Baron Cohen, who wrote his thesis at Cambridge on Jewish participation in the American civil-rights movement, modeled Borat on an unintentionally funny Russian he had met. His character started out as Moldovan and then became Albanian. There are plenty of scary Albanian gangsters in Western Europe who might have taken active offense, however, and Borat was relocated to far-off Kazakhstan in Central Asia.

In reality, Kazakhstan is an arid land of mostly Asian-looking people, but in Baron Cohen’s imagination, it’s a travesty of old stereotypes about Eastern Europe. The vulgar yet somehow innocent journalist’s home was filmed 2,500 miles away in an impoverished Romanian village so that Baron Cohen could indulge in traditional Ashkenazi anti-gentilism, the clever townsman’s disdain for the slower-witted peasant.

“Borat” is a 21st-century version of the Polish jokes that Borscht Belt comedians like Henny Youngman once helped popularize. While Ali G was a milestone in contemporary social satire, the anti-Slavic depiction of Borat as the ultimate *goyishe kop* (he carries a chicken in his suitcase and has no idea what a toilet is for) is old-fashioned and purposeless.

Still, the film is awfully funny in its intentionally lowbrow way. One highlight is Borat warmly assuring a Virginia rodeo audience, “We support your war of terror ... And may George Bush drink the blood of every man, woman, and child in Iraq!”

What are almost as amusing are the rapturous critics’ attempts to explain why the film is Good for You. “The brilliance of ‘Borat,’” enthuses Manohla

Dargis in the *New York Times*, “is that its comedy is as pitiless as its social satire, and as brainy.” Huh?

“Borat,” we are advised, is an Important Message Movie because it portrays Kazakhs—and Red State Americans—as anti-Semites. I suspect the critics (and Baron Cohen himself) are confusing “Kazakhs” with “Cossacks,” the Czar’s irregular cavalry who were notorious perpetrators of pogroms. Actually, the Cossacks began as Slavic serfs who escaped to the steppe and adopted some of the horse-centered culture of the Asiatic Kazakhs. Anti-Semitism, however, has not been a major theme in Kazakh life.

Dargis assures us the semi-scripted movie “will freeze your blood,” exposing the hidden anti-Semitism of the American South when Borat says something casually anti-Semitic to an American, who fails to gasp with appropriate horror or to immediately bundle the visitor off to a cultural sensitivity re-education camp. In truth, Borat must have struck most Americans not in on the joke as either a harmless boob or a demented lunatic. Humoring him would be the sanest strategy for getting him to go away.

The Fox studio has marketed the low-budget “Borat” superbly, with Baron Cohen working harder to garner free publicity than any self-promoter since Spike Lee’s 1992 campaign for “Malcolm X.” Fox’s masterful hyping of “Borat” is in ironic contrast to how in September the studio drowned like an unwanted kitten the similarly crude and hilarious but much smarter and more politically daring “Idiocracy,” the sci-fi black comedy about America’s dysgenic future by the dazzling but diffident Mike Judge. ■

Rated R for relentless filthiness.

BOOKS

[*American Conservatism: An Encyclopedia*, Bruce Frohnen, Jeremy Beer, and Jeffrey O. Nelson, eds., ISI Books, 979 pages]

Conservatism From A to Z

By Daniel McCarthy

THE DINNER at Philadelphia's Old Original Bookbinder's restaurant last April celebrating the launch of *American Conservatism: An Encyclopedia* was not your typical book party. For starters, many of those in attendance—the event coincided with the annual meeting of the Philadelphia Society—were profiled within or contributors to the book. At my table sat conservative movement historian Lee Edwards and Russell Kirk exegete Wesley McDonald, along with their delightful wives and the promising young conservative Gladden Pappin, son of Burke scholar Joseph Pappin III. Across the way was Midge Decter, embedded amid a phalanx of admiring retainers. At the podium stood the pre-eminent historian of the 20th-century intellectual Right, George H. Nash, whose remarks hit a note of ambivalence altogether unexpected at such a gathering.

Nash reminded his audience that many a great movement had begun as a church, turned into a business, and ended up as a scam. Would the American Right follow suit? His liberal acquaintances had warned Nash that the encyclopedia was a sure sign of senescence—conservatives turning in upon themselves to stare at their own navels. Yet Nash thought otherwise: the book was rather proof that the Right still cared about its roots and had amassed an intellectual tradition sufficient to fill a thousand-page tome, as

effective a rebuttal as can be imagined to Lionel Trilling's famous pronouncement that American conservatives have no ideas but only "irritable mental gestures which seek to resemble ideas."

Even so, Nash had raised doubts. The speaker who followed him, émigré historian John Lukacs, dispelled them—he left no doubt at all that the Right had become a scam, one colored by a nationalism "so broad as to be flat, so narrow in spirit as to be poisonous." The paradigmatic conservative city, he pointed out, would be a soulless conurbation in Texas—a Dallas or a Houston with a sky-high divorce rate. And the people who once complained about big government in fact "are for big government, as long as it's called 'defense.'"

I glanced over at Midge Decter, who looked like a basilisk. Tomorrow, I feared, the American Enterprise Institute might demand Lukacs's native Hungary be President Bush's next target for "liberation."

This book launch had the feel of a wake—an Irish wake for some, not so much for others—attended by Montagues and Capulets. Yet an appropriate spirit it was, for the book contains something of Nash's genteel ambiguity and Lukacs's unsparing honesty, as well as Decter's herpetological resolve. This is all to the good. *American Conservatism: An Encyclopedia* doesn't truck in the witless triumphalism that characterizes so much of the Right. Nor does it present any feigned unity. Instead, editors Bruce Frohnen, Jeremy Beer, and Jeffrey O. Nelson—professor at Ave Maria law school and editor in chief and publisher of ISI Books, respectively—let all the many schools of thought within American conservatism (and libertarianism, too) have their own say. Entries on divisive figures are here given, as a general rule, to sympathetic profilers, which is the only way a book like this could have been assembled without becoming a polemic in its own right. "The reader will not get very far in this volume before beginning to notice the tensions and outright contradictions

that exist and have existed among conservatives—on matters of principle no less than on matters of policy," the editors warn.

The encyclopedia has been gestating for over a decade—so long, in fact, that many of the most notable entries come from giants of the conservative movement who have since died. Russell Kirk, libertarian paragon Murray Rothbard, and Southern scholar Melvin Bradford all make posthumous appearances with new essays here. (All three men, who died in the mid-1990s, also receive biographical entries.) No less impressive are the entries from still-living titans of the American Right: Stephen Tonsor contributes the profile on Lord Acton; Peter Stanlis delivers entries on Burke and Burkeanism and also on Robert Frost, whom he knew; Ralph Raico writes the entry on classical liberalism. Tonsor's essay on "equality" is masterful, concluding with the penetrating, cold-eyed observation that "the political problem of the twenty-first century is the problem of maintaining the fiction of equal political participation while encouraging the increased growth of creative inequalities in society." One wonders whether a younger scholar would be so frank in flouting the equalitarian sensibilities that are now so commonplace even on the Right.

Yet for all the stature of its contributors and the sheer heft of the book itself, at a glance the encyclopedia may seem underwhelming. Few of the 626 entries are more than a page long, and several of those that are do not deserve their length. Daniel Webster, for example, receives more space than either Thomas Jefferson or George Washington. At the end of each entry comes a short list of suggestions for further reading—typically just three or four books. These supplement the handful of named sources cited in most entries. As big a brick as it is, one might think this compendium would have to be much larger to do its subject justice.

But that's what is most impressive about *American Conservatism: An Encyclopedia*—not its girth but its pithi-

ness. To say that not a single word or “further reading” recommendation is wasted wouldn’t be quite true. But it is very nearly so: however short the bibliographical apparatus, its suggestions are well chosen, and the articles themselves succeed remarkably well in conveying in a very short space the substance of the persons, institutions, and ideas to which they are devoted. The limited length of each entry unavoidably imposes constraints, but the encyclopedia largely succeeds in making a virtue of what would otherwise be a handicap.

Also impressive is the breadth of material covered by the book, which doesn’t quail to venture far afield of right-wing orthodoxy. Bill Kauffman’s entry on “anarchism” is a sterling example. More conventionally conservative topics are treated to several entries: the Christian dimension of the American Right is represented in lengthy essays on Roman Catholicism and both mainline and evangelical Protestantism, as well as in profiles of religious figures ranging from J. Gresham Machen and Cornelius Van Til to Pope John Paul II. (The essay on the late pope, unfortunately, is distorted by a selective political emphasis that glosses over his criticisms of war, capitalism, and capital punishment. His teachings have been sanitized for conservatives’ convenience.) Old Right figures, Austrian economists, and Southern Agrarians all get their due. Only politicians are deliberately—and wisely—underemphasized, although somehow Dan Quayle has merited an entry.

There are exceptions to the general rule that sympathetic authors handle the more polarizing entries. Particularly where scientific entries are concerned, some mismatches occur. Self-described Darwinian conservative Larry Arnhart writes on “Intelligent Design,” presenting ID not as a scientific or even pseudoscientific endeavor but instead as a moralistic and political movement. Arnhart doesn’t deign to mention ID’s central tenet, that design must be inferred from the mathematical complexity of living beings. It may be buncombe, but ID deserves to be

treated in a manner that at least allows the reader to understand what it is arguing.

A parallel defect, meanwhile, mars Boston University education professor M.D. Aeschliman’s entry on “science and scientism.” Aeschliman grossly oversimplifies a philosophical problem when he writes that a belief in determinism involves a self-contradiction. Readers would have been better served by the Discovery Institute-connected Aeschliman writing on Intelligent Design and Arnhart providing the entry on science.

The “science and scientism” entry points to a larger problem with *American Conservatism: An Encyclopedia*: there is a tendency for some of the entries to slip into a species of right-wing political correctness, particularly of a Straussian variety. Hence several essays treat historicism, relativism, and nihilism as the roots of all modern leftism. The trouble is that historicism, as Claes Ryn’s entry on the subject argues, is arguably more conservative than leftist—indeed, Leo Strauss considered Edmund Burke a historicist, although he didn’t mean that judgment as a compliment. Relativism, too, easily becomes a straw man, and even nihilism is not, properly speaking, synonymous with evil. Presidential scholar Gleaves Whitney provides exemplary entries on the Enlightenment and the French Revolution—the latter, in fact, so good that I thought it might have been written by Stephen Tonsor before I saw the byline—and his essay on nihilism is thought-provoking. But it is also highly colored by Allan Bloom and trades on clichés when it claims “nihilism is associated with fascist and Nazi doctrines, especially since the latter are linked to aspects of Nietzsche’s thought.” The assertion is more polemical than truthful.

A Straussian problem of a different sort crops up in editor Bruce Frohnen’s entry on the American Revolution: the piece is written largely as a refutation of West Coast Straussian Harry Jaffa’s take on the revolution. This is problematic for at least two reasons. First, perhaps out of a sense of scholarly etiquette, Frohnen

never specifically mentions Jaffa in the article, leaving him to be cited only in the cross-references at the end of the piece. This is tremendously unhelpful for anyone not already well versed in the internecine battles of the intellectual Right, who will wonder who it is within the conservative movement who “accept[s] the notion that the American Revolution created a new America, radically separated from the institutions and habits of the old world.” What’s worse, the entry doesn’t give an accurate representation of just how wide-ranging conservative views on the American Revolution have been. By overemphasizing the Jaffa line of argument (again, without actually naming him), Frohnen does a disservice to other conservatives who have argued more persuasively that the American Revolution truly was revolutionary, a view held by men on the Right from Robert Nisbet all the way back to John Adams. (Nisbet’s 1976 pamphlet “The Social Impact of the Revolution” is well worth hunting down.)

That cavil is not to detract from Frohnen’s achievement, with Nelson and Beer, in assembling this book. It’s both an invaluable resource for conservatives—and for anyone with an interest in American intellectual history—and a pleasure to read. *American Conservatism: An Encyclopedia* is also a fitting tribute to the hundreds of men and women who have contributed to conservative thought over the past half-century and more.

Donald Atwell Zoll, a mostly forgotten traditionalist who wrote frequently for *National Review* in its early days and taught philosophy for decades until it was revealed that he never obtained a Ph.D., receives the last entry in the book. Since his fall from academic grace, Zoll has apparently become an elephant trainer. Perhaps therein lies a minatory lesson for the American Right, a reminder for conservatives justly proud of their intellectual tradition of the old cycle that leads from hubris to nemesis and sees even the most principled movements transformed from church to business to scam. ■

[*A Glorious Disaster: Barry Goldwater's Presidential Campaign and the Origins of the Conservative Movement*, J. William Middendorf II, Basic Books, 290 pages]

You Know He's Right

By Gregory L. Schneider

IN A RECENT HBO DOCUMENTARY on Barry Goldwater produced, written, and directed by C.C. Goldwater, Barry's granddaughter, one of the more interesting comments came from former CBS News anchor Walter Cronkite: "If Barry were alive today, he'd be a liberal." I doubt it, but from the talking heads on the program, including Senator Hilary Rodham Clinton (who was a Goldwater girl before she went to college) and James Carville, you'd think that Goldwater ran on the donkey's ticket back in 1964.

The reason for the liberal love-fest for Goldwater has to do with the senator's longstanding antipathy to the social politics of the Religious Right. While Goldwater was a conservative, he was never comfortable with the social issues of the 1970s and with the Moral Majority or its supporters.

Goldwater was always libertarian-oriented when it came to his social politics. In the 1981 battle over Arizonan Sandra Day O'Connor's nomination to the Supreme Court—most conservatives justifiably opposed her—Goldwater said of Moral Majority leader Jerry Falwell (who never publicly opposed O'Connor), "every good Christian should line up and kick [his] ass." No wonder Carville, Clinton, and Cronkite find him so appealing.

Despite the strange new respect some modern liberals have for Goldwater, his appeal for conservatives will always be cemented by his challenge to Lyndon Johnson in 1964. What historians used to depict as a great liberal triumph is now the jumping-off point for conservatism as a political movement and "the last liberal campaign."

From the founding of Young Americans for Freedom in 1960—ostensibly due to the publication of Goldwater's *Conscience of a Conservative*—to the formation of the New York Conservative Party to William F. Buckley's run for mayor of New York City ("If I won, I'd demand a recount") to the election of Ronald Reagan as governor of California in 1966 and finally to the takeover of the GOP by conservatives in the 1970s, Goldwater served as the *prima voce* of the emerging conservative majority.

Getting us back to that moment—despite the klaxon-din of liberals claiming Goldwater as one of their own—is the major achievement of a new memoir of the Goldwater draft movement and 1964 campaign by J. William Middendorf II. Middendorf was one of the principal organizers of the Draft Goldwater effort and the only member of that group who stayed on in an official capacity during the campaign.

My initial reaction to a new memoir about 1964 was, "Oh no, another story by an insider in the Goldwater campaign!" We already have chronicles by F. Clifton White (*Suite 3505*), William Rusher (*Rise of the Right*), Lee Edwards (*Goldwater*—a biography that contains snippets of Edwards's role in the campaign), as well as numerous campaign histories, several biographies of the senator, and other accounts of conservatism in the 1960s. Is there anything new to say?

Thankfully, yes. Middendorf has a few new stories to tell as well as some different interpretations of older stories. In his breezy memoir, we get a lively and updated account of the Goldwater campaign and its impact on conservative politics. His role as the treasurer of the campaign gives insight into the dynamics of campaign financing in those days, and his long involvement in GOP politics makes for an interesting story about how much has changed since 1964.

There is not much about Middendorf's life in the book. He discusses how "my early political and economic thinking had been conditioned in the quasi-Marxist world of eastern prep schools

and Harvard." He entered Harvard in 1943, apolitical, shy, and withdrawn at 6'5" tall, with a bad complexion; he relates how he was "overwhelmed by a team of absolutely stunning girls wearing some sort of Eastern European peasant garb" who wanted him to join their political club, which just turned out to be the John Reed Club. As Middendorf writes, "had I accepted their offer to join the Communist club, you most likely would not be holding this book today." Perhaps not, but given the earlier leftist careers of many on the Right, he might still have wound up a neoconservative at least. It probably would have kept him from being a guest at John F. Kennedy's wedding, however, a surprising tidbit he mentions in the book.

In the early 1960s, Middendorf worked for his family's investment company on Wall Street and was interested in getting involved in politics. He became active as a fundraiser for the Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee and grew to know Goldwater, who headed up the GOP's Senate races. Middendorf did not know him well, however, when William Rusher and John Ashbrook began their effort to recruit Goldwater for the 1964 GOP nomination—a project exposed by Cronkite (who you can be sure never saw Goldwater as a liberal then) in a Dec. 2, 1962 broadcast on CBS News. Goldwater was not interested in running and had no problem telling Clif White this fact.

But the men in the organization persevered and drafted Goldwater to be the nominee. Goldwater knew the cause was hopeless, especially after the death of his friend Kennedy in November 1963. He and Kennedy had hoped to tour the country together in one plane, debating at various stops. In an increasingly polarized political world such a tactic may have revolutionized presidential campaigning.

Instead, Goldwater was matched against Lyndon Johnson, a "dirty fighter" as he called him. Persuaded by his campaign advisers and by friends like John Tower and Norris Cotton that it was too late to turn back, Goldwater decided to run. "Lose the election, but win the

party,” Middendorf has Goldwater saying in early January when he announced his decision to run. Goldwater would do just that.

The reasons Goldwater lost are well worn, and Middendorf stakes no new ground here. Not only did Goldwater face Johnson, a political master who stopped at nothing to win, he also confronted opposition from within his own party, liberals like Nelson Rockefeller and William Scranton. Goldwater’s campaign team also floundered, with the senator surrounded by inexperienced Arizonans like Denison Kitchel and American Enterprise Institute chairman William Baroody, who isolated the *National Review* conservatives from active roles in the campaign.

monger by the media—Johnson used every dirty tactic imaginable to win. Just as Goldwater thought, he epitomized the “dirty fighter” image.

Goldwater, however, was an inept campaigner and his own worst enemy. Blunt, defensive, ornery, Goldwater refused to participate in the game of political campaigning. Middendorf describes many incidents in which a tired Goldwater refused to greet well-wishers (some of whom had waited for hours at airports) and instead walked right past to get to his waiting car. He disdained “puff pieces” about himself or his family, though he did allow himself to be filmed on his ham radio, a constant companion during the campaign. Middendorf describes one funny incident

In the end, it is hard to deny Middendorf’s claim that the Goldwater campaign was a glorious disaster. He proudly writes as former finance chairman that the campaign ended with a budget surplus—though much of the money budgeted for ads and for commercials went unspent when it appeared the gig was up late in October. The campaign did lay the groundwork for later success.

Middendorf concludes the book discussing his role in the formation of the American Conservative Union and in the Nixon administration, where he served as secretary of the Navy. He would go on to be an ambassador and a board member of the Heritage Foundation. For him, the world he helped create through his labors in 1964 bore fruit, allowing him entrée into the world of GOP politics.

At the end of the campaign in 1964, Middendorf wrote a lengthy memorandum about where the campaign went wrong. He concluded, “The Democrats had long since learned that most voters knew little, and cared less, about issues. The Democrats appealed to emotion. We appealed to logic. We lost.”

Perhaps that is an accurate assessment. The emotion against Goldwater was visceral, and liberalism was still in its heyday. It wasn’t hard in the climate of the 1960s to label Goldwater a fascist and a racist. Within 15 years and with a far better candidate, conservatives would claim victory even when liberals said the same things about Ronald Reagan.

Conservatives won in 1980 (and later) by combining emotional appeals with grassroots mobilization around issues, like opposition to abortion, whose logic Goldwater could never seem to grasp. Neither could the liberals who now claim Goldwater as their own. Perhaps one reader of this book should be C.C. Goldwater, who might learn what her grandfather really stood for and why in many conservatives’ hearts he will always be right, not left. ■

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BLUNT, DEFENSIVE, ORNERY, GOLDWATER REFUSED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE GAME OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING.

Then there was the candidate himself. Middendorf admires Goldwater tremendously and numerous times credits him for taking a principled stance on issues during the campaign. When supporters made a short film, “Choice,” which showed rioting in urban areas (with white college students and black inner-city kids featured throughout), Goldwater decided not to air it, believing it depicted blacks as the rioters more frequently than whites. “It is racist,” Goldwater said. Goldwater also refused to use the scandal surrounding Walter Jenkins, Johnson’s long-time aide who was arrested *en flagrante* with another man at a Washington YMCA. When the campaign suggested slogans like “Either Way with LBJ,” Goldwater said, “Hands off.”

Johnson and the media, who were the incumbent’s lapdogs throughout the campaign, never hesitated to depict Goldwater in unflattering terms. From the daisy ad (an invention of later PBS ethics-in-government champion Bill Moyers) to the CIA bugging of Goldwater’s airplane to the consistently hostile press—Goldwater was labeled everything from a fascist to a racist to a war-

where Goldwater—an Air Force reserve pilot—took the controls of the campaign plane and proceeded to land in what the author describes as perhaps one of the worst landings ever; he wonders if Goldwater did it purposefully as the media were sitting in the rear of the plane and would have had the worst of the landing.

Goldwater was no Ronald Reagan when it came to his campaign style or his personality. His ideas were sound, but often Goldwater couldn’t convey them effectively, sticking, as Middendorf argues, to “national themes” rather than to local issues that could have been used more effectively. There are the old stories about Goldwater stumping for the elimination of Social Security before an audience of senior citizens or the termination of the Tennessee Valley Authority while appearing in Tennessee. Goldwater was surely ahead of his time in discussing the elimination of these government programs; it was Americans who would have to catch up (and in the case of Social Security privatization, as George W. Bush discovered, there are still miles to go in making the case).

MUSIC

Bach Reaches Out to God

By Ralph de Toledano

JOHANN SEBASTIAN BACH, the most towering figure in music's pantheon, saw composition and performance as a craft, more exalted than pottery making but no inspirational bath. To the compliments on his organ playing, he once responded, "There is nothing remarkable about it. All one has to do is hit the right notes at the right time and the instrument plays itself." Put down the right notes in the right way and you have great music. He would have been baffled by later composers who courted the muse by deep-breathing and yanking at the psyche. It was his craft to compose, working at it steadily and producing more than a thousand works.

His religious compositions alone would have sufficed for any other composer—five "Passions" and three oratorios, plus Masses, Magnificats, motets, and other larger and smaller works for church use. Secularly, there was his *Kunst der Fuge*, his skeletal "Art of the Fugue" which took that form as far as it could go; the Concertos for Violin in A Minor and E Major and the Double Concerto in D Minor (recorded respectively by Isaac Stern and Stern and Itzhak Perlman); the *Clavier-Übung* in the distinguished renditions of Paul Badura-Skoda; and the many other works for most of the instrumental gamut.

Yet we forget in our awed admiration and respect for Bach's genius and the unflagging beauty and solidity of his music that when what some consider his greatest religious work, the "St. Matthew Passion," was first performed, there were critics who dismissed it as "operatic comedy." For a hundred years it was forgotten until the 20-year-old Mendelssohn resurrected it—and then it

was greeted as if it were the Second Coming. Berlioz, who understood Bach with more precision than the new worshippers, would write somewhat petulantly, "God is God and Bach is Bach."

Bach believed that the "aim and final reason" of all music is "the glory of God. ... Where this is not observed, there will be no real music, but only a devilish hubbub." Even in his most secular works, he was addressing God. My own view is that he was speaking more to God's glory in the B Minor Mass than in the "St. Matthew Passion." For one thing, the Romance languages—Latin, Spanish, Italian—are pen-throated. German, the language of the "Passion," is not. How can one speak freely to God with an *umlaut* caught in the gullet? Bach coped with this difficulty, but he could not surmount it. Perhaps he realized this, because it is always the violins that soften the sung language when the Christ is singing.

Nevertheless the power, the beauty, and the cadence of the "St. Matthew Passion" cannot be gainsaid. I remember the tremendous excitement in the late 1930s

In contrast to the "St. Matthew Passion"—Bach's most fervent Protestant and Germanic statement of belief—there is the less personal Mass in B Minor, in which he reaches back in spirit 150 years to the Catholic expression of Giovanni Pierluigi da Palestrina and Tomás Luis de Victoria. Bach sent the first section of the B Minor to the Catholic Elector of Saxony with a request for a court appointment. It is often said that his motivation was simply to get an appointment. But it is impossible to listen to the B Minor Mass and still hold that opinion. Bach took his theology seriously, and I subscribe to the more reasonable explanation that he was appealing to the *catholicism* of the Catholic Church.

After re-playing the "St. Matthew Passion," I took down the old but still great recording of the B Minor by Herbert von Karajan, with Elizabeth Schwarzkopf and Nicolai Gedda among the soloists, and a much later one by Otto Klemperer and the New Philharmonic Orchestra, also with Gedda. Could career consider-

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BACH COPED WITH THIS DIFFICULTY, BUT HE COULD NOT SURMOUNT IT.

when RCA Victor issued the first complete recording. Those were the days of the heavy 78 rpm shellacs, and the three muscle-challenging volumes of the "Passion," with their awkward breaks as each record thudded down on the turntable, were a trial. Then we later had it on three long-playing records, stereo, digitally recorded, and later still on CD, beautifully paced and sung by the Knabenchor Hannover and the NDR Symphony Orchestra, directed by Raymond Leppard.

The "St. Matthew Passion" is grandly conceived—in 24 scenes, double-choruses, chorales, arias, concerted passages. Yet underlying this structural complexity there is the deep simplicity of a foursquare and personal religious statement. Perhaps Leppard is telling us that if you play the right notes at the right time, the music conducts itself.

ations have produced the tranquility and exaltation of the "Et Unam" or the "Et incarnatus est?" Could a composer who believed that all music was a celebration of God have written the tremendous grandeur of the "Sanctus" merely to get a court appointment? In the "St. Matthew Passion," Bach faced towards the Reformation, in the B Minor Mass towards the Counter-Reformation. In the former, he took a step forward to the music that would evolve. In the latter he stepped back to the mysticism of Victoria and the effulgence of Palestrina. In both he lifts up his eyes and his heart to God. ■

Ralph de Toledano, a veteran newsman and former Newsweek editor, is the author most recently of Cry Havoc: The Great American Bring-down and How It Happened.

Slipshod Scribblers



I have a terrible confession to make. Sen. John Kerry was right, except for one tiny detail. Nothing good comes to people who goof off in

class, don't do their homework, and cheat in their exams. Only they don't end up in Iraq. They end up as journalists, sending others to Iraq.

The bad habits they pick up at school serve them well in a profession that thrives on laziness. (One of the main reasons I became a journalist.) Rather than do original research or develop new sources or leads, journalists prefer to rely on government handouts. Rather than pick up a telephone to hear both sides of the story, they would rather call their one or two tried and true sources, not coincidentally the same one or two tried and true sources that other hacks rely on. I was recently rung up by a London *Daily Mail* hack asking me if *Vanity Fair* magazine had paid for a party I gave in London to celebrate my birthday. "What reason could *VF* possibly have to pick up the tab for a party I gave for my friends?" I said. "There is absolutely no truth to it." Well, you guessed it. The next day the hack led off his column in London's leading tabloid that *VF* had paid for my party. Outrageously unfair? Not really, just par for the course.

Mind you, the British press is the yellowest this side of the Greek one, but even here, in the Land of the Free, hacks feel free to ruin the reputation of anyone they don't agree with or happen to dislike. When *TAC* was starting up four years ago, I had many journalists ring me up pretending to wish to interview me about the magazine. Some did, most of them didn't—mention the magazine, that is. One of them, a woman, I found

going through my mail and my wastepaper basket. She works for *Tatler* magazine in London. No wonder the old joke about a journalist who is discovered working on a paper by a friend and who tells the friend, "For God's sake, don't tell my mother I'm a reporter, she thinks I play the piano in a whorehouse," works. As does the old Baldwin jibe—he had Beaverbrook in mind—that journalism enjoyed the prerogative of the harlot throughout the ages: power without responsibility.

Journalists actually are purveyors of conventional wisdom. This makes them very useful mouthpieces for corporations. As the poet Humbert Wolfe wrote: "You cannot hope to bribe or twist / Thank God! The British journalist / But, seeing what the man will do / Unbribed, there's no occasion to."

Making up stories out of whole cloth comes naturally to people who honed their skills inventing variations on "the dog ate my homework." If he hadn't become a politician, Bill Clinton, a very skilled and persuasive liar, would have or should have been a journalist. He would have been a great one. Almost as good as Judith Miller in the *New York Times* talking twaddle about Saddam's supposed weapons of mass destruction and relying on the word of mega-crook and con man Ahmad Chalabi. Probably better than Jeffrey Goldberg in *The New Yorker* hyping up a fanciful link between Saddam and al-Qaeda. His other mentors could have been Ruth Shalit, with her multiple plagiarisms at *The New Republic*, Stephen Glass writing fiction

and passing it off as fact, and of course Jayson Blair of the good old *New York Times*.

Okay, I am being a bit tough on the Fourth Estate, perhaps because I know it quite well. It was Carlyle who called hacks the Fourth Estate, referring to the enormous power wielded by those who direct the flow of information.

But let's face it, the power is staggering. Control of the press is concentrated in a few hands and their responsibilities are small in proportion to their power. Hacks can set up their own kangaroo courts in which they figure as prosecutor, counsel, jury, and judge. Awareness of this power sets the tone and puts a swagger in the media's step. It respects no authority and is cavalier where the right of individual privacy is concerned. In fact, it tends to see itself above the law, and governments quail before the media as kings once did before barons.


And it gets worse. Journalism is supposed to report the facts, however unobjectively, but now it has morphed into entertainment. Caught up in the ratings war, the search for profits, and ego gratification, hacks are now seen as less trustworthy than lawyers, used-car salesmen, and undertakers.

Two generations ago, Noel Coward sang, "Don't put your daughter on the stage, Mrs. Worthington," warning of the perils that stage-struck young women had to endure as showgirls. If he were alive today, the "master" would surely be warning Mrs. Worthington not to let her daughter become a journalist. Then again, he might not. Judith Miller, Maureen Dowd, Leslie Stahl, Barbara Walters, and others of their ilk have not done so badly. It beats having to sleep with Harvey Weinstein. ■

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